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The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience
.and Its Consequences for Career
Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court
Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin
For at least three decades now, those charged with nominating and con-
firming Justices to the U.S. Supreme Court seem to be following a norm of
prior judicial experience-one that makes previous service on the (federal)
bench a near prerequisite for office. Largely as a result of this norm, to-
day 's Court, while growing more and more diverse on some dimensions, is
becoming less and less so on the dimension of career diversity.
We argue that all norms that cut against diversity are problematic because
they reduce the ability of the decision-making group (the Supreme Court
not excepted) to perform its tasks. We further argue that the norm of prior
judicial experience is particularly troublesome for two reasons. First, since
virtually all analyses show career path to be an important factor in ex-
plaining judicial choices-from the votes Justices cast to their respect for
stare decisis-the homogeneity induced by the norm suggests that the cur-
rent Court is not making optimal choices. Second, since women and people
of color are less likely than White men to hold positions that are now, un-
der the norm of prior judicial experience, steppingstones to the bench, the
norm is also working to limit diversity on dimensions other than career
path.
This Article draws on multiple sources, ranging from an original database
that houses a wealth of information on the occupational backgrounds of
the Court's Justices to the writings of leading contemporary thinkers.
From these sources, we extract a clear and significant policy implica-
tion: Because of problems associated with a perpetuation of the norm of
prior judicial experience, we argue that the Senate, the president, and
other key players in the confirmation process should give greater attention
to the nominees' career experiences. But such attention ought not come in
the form of reserving the next two, three, or four vacancies for nominees
hailing directly from private practice, legislatures, the cabinet, and so on.
Rather, it should come about by taking into account the career experiences
of Justices remaining on the Court and then working to avoid excessive
duplication.
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INTRODUCTION
J. Harvie Wilkinson, Frank Easterbrook, Emilio Garza, J. Michael
Luttig, Edith Jones, and Janice Rogers Brown. All of these persons have at
least two things in common. First, they are the most "frequently named
potential George W. Bush U.S. Supreme Court nominees."' Second, they
are sitting judges-with all but Brown serving on a U.S. court of appeals.'
This is no coincidence. For at least three decades, those charged with
nominating and confirming Supreme Court justices seem to be following a
norm of prior judicial experience-one that makes previous service on the
(federal) bench a near prerequisite for office.' In fact, since William H.
Rehnquist's appointment in 1971, no president has nominated and no
Senate has confirmed a justice to the Supreme Court who lacked judicial
experience.' Furthermore, more than fifty years have elapsed since a presi-
dent has elevated a sitting legislator to the Court (Harold Burton in 1945),
forty since the appointment of a cabinet secretary (Arthur Goldberg in
1962), and thirty since the nomination of an attorney hailing directly from
private practice (Lewis F. Powell in 1971).'
Largely as a result of this norm of prior judicial experience, today's
Court, while growing more diverse in some dimensions,6 is becoming less
so on the dimension of career diversity. All nine justices serving in 2002
held positions in the public sector immediately before their ascension to the
Court. With the exception of Chief Justice Rehnquist, who did not obtain
his position by way of the nation's judiciary, the other eight justices served
on either state or U.S. courts of appeals before joining the Court.' Just three
1. E.g., Kenneth L. Manning et al., George W. Bush's Potential Supreme Court
Nominees: What Impact Might They Have?, 85 JUDICATURE 278, 280-81 (2002). The authors
developed their list of potential nominees by consulting "five diverse news, opinion, and legal
information sources: ABC News, USA Today, The American Prospect, National Review, and Lexis-
Nexis." Id.
2. Brown is an associate justice on the California Supreme Court. Easterbrook serves on the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Garza and Jones are on the Fifth Circuit; and Luttig and
Wilkinson are on the Fourth Circuit.
3. See, e.g., HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS (1999), MARK
SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIOUS CHOICES (1994), DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES (1999). See
also infra Part I (providing more discussion of the norm of prior judicial experience, including its
origins).
4. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND
DEVELOPMENTS 324-31 tbl.4-9 (3d ed. 2003).
5. Id. Justices nominated after Powell had experience working in private law firms, see infra
note 8, but Powell was the last justice who was in private practice at the time of appointment. Id'
6. For example, on the current Court there are three Catholics, two Jews, two women, and one
Black. Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas are Catholics. Thomas was born into a Baptist family but was
raised as a Catholic by his grandparents; he later attended an Episcopal church, but in 1996, he returned
to the Catholic church. Breyer and Ginsburg are Jewish; O'Connor and Ginsburg are women; and
Thomas is Black. Id. at 267-331 tbl.4-3.
7. Stevens served on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Scalia, Thomas, and
Ginsburg on the District of Columbia Circuit; Kennedy on the Ninth Circuit; Souter and Breyer on the
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of the nine justices came to the bench with any long-term experience in
private practice, while two never practiced in a private law firm at all.8
Moreover, even though all but two worked at some point as government
attorneys,9 only Justice Thomas held an appointed position in the executive
branch"0 that did not necessitate a law degree." No previous members of a
presidential cabinet can be found among the current justices, nor are there
any former Senators or even members of the House of Representatives. In
fact, Justice O'Connor is the Court's only member ever elected to a public
office that did not call for a legal background. 2
This degree of career homogeneity has not gone unnoticed by schol-
ars. After conducting an extensive investigation into factors affecting
presidential choices of Supreme Court nominees, David Yalof claimed that
"federal circuit court judges have become the 'darlings' of the selection
process."' 3 Other commentators agree, 4 as do jurists. Just this past year,
Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that, while at one time his Court housed
justices "drawn from a wide diversity of professional backgrounds" such as
Louis Brandeis, John Harlan, and Byron White, those days are long gone. 5
First Circuit; O'Connor on the Arizona court of appeals. Before his appointment, Rehnquist served as
U.S. Assistant Attorney General. Id. at 324-31 tbl.4-9.
8. Kennedy was in private practice from 1961 to 1976, Rehnquist from 1953 to 1969, and
Stevens from 1948 to 1951 and 1952 to 1970; Ginsburg and Breyer never practiced in a private law
firm. The remaining four (O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas) worked in private law firms, but that
experience typically came early in their careers, or was rather short lived, or both. Consider Justice
Scalia: After graduating from law school in 1960, he went into private practice in Cleveland, Ohio,
where he remained until 1967. For the next fifteen years, he taught at the University of Chicago Law
School, with interruptions here and there for various posts within the federal government until his final
departure in 1982 for a U.S. judgeship. All told, of the twenty-six years between the time he obtained
his law degree and his nomination to the Court, Scalia spent six years (less than 25%) in private
practice. This level of experience is not atypical for this Court. Collectively, the nine justices worked in
private law firms for sixty-nine years, yielding a median of six years. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4,
at 272-80 tbl.4-6.
9. The two are Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg. See id. at 312-31 tbl.4-8.
10. Justice Thomas served as Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
between 1982 and 1990.
11. The term "necessitate" requires explanation since many legal positions in government do not
formally require law degrees. It would be possible, for example, for a president to nominate a
nonlawyer to serve as Attorney General or even as a Supreme Court justice. In fact, early holders of
those positions (e.g., Nathan Clifford, who served as U.S. Attorney General between 1846 and 1848,
and became a Supreme Court justice in 1858) typically did not have law degrees. Rather, "it was
common for lawyers to be trained by 'reading the law'. .. . This was accomplished through self-study
or by serving as an apprentice under an experienced lawyer. Only in the more modem period have
justices trained in a formal law school setting." EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 293 tbl. 4-4.
Nonetheless, since it is unlikely that a contemporary president would appoint a non-J.D. to these sorts
of positions, we use the term "necessitate" (or "require") here and throughout the Article.
12. Justice O'Connor served in the Arizona Senate from 1969 to 1975. See id. at 318 tbl.4-8.
13. YALOF, supra note 3, at 170.
14. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 3, at 41-45; SILVERSTEIN, supra note 3, at 166-76.
15. William H. Rehnquist, 2001 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2001year-endreport.html (Jan. 1, 2002). The
relevant portion of Rehnquist's report is as follows:
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That presidents now look primarily to the U.S. courts of appeals to
identify potential nominees disturbs Rehnquist because he fears that the
Court will over time "too much resemble the judiciary in civil law
countries."' 6 As discussed below, these civil law judiciaries consist mainly
of judges whose only career experience is service on the court. As a result,
Rehnquist notes, these courts "simply do not command the respect and
enjoy the independence of ours."' 7 We are likewise disturbed by the lack of
career diversity apparently resulting from the norm of prior judicial experi-
ence, but for a different reason: Norms that cut against diversity reduce the
ability of the decision-making group to perform its responsibilities.
Although this issue holds for virtually all norms and all groups, the
Supreme Court not excepted, the norm of prior judicial experience is par-
ticularly troublesome for two reasons. First, virtually all analyses show
career path to be an important factor in explaining judicial decision mak-
ing-from the votes justices cast to their respect for stare decisis.'5 The
current Court's career homogeneity suggests that it is not making optimal
choices, or at least choices less optimal than those made by its more di-
verse predecessors. Second, since women and members of racial/ethnic
minorities are less likely than White men to hold the positions that are cur-
rently steppingstones to the bench, 9 the norm of prior judicial experience
is working to limit not only career diversity but also gender and ra-
cial/ethnic diversity.
Our general claim thus is a simple one. We argue that there now exists
a norm of prior judicial experience that induces a highly problematic level
of career homogeneity on the Court. To support our argument, we demon-
strate empirically in Part I what the extant commentary suggests: The
career paths of justices serving on the Court are consistent with the exis-
tence of a norm of prior judicial experience. We further show that the
norm, again in line with speculation on the part of commentators, has led to
an extraordinary lack of career diversity. At no other time in American his-
tory has the Court been composed of justices so alike in terms of their
The federal Judiciary has traditionally drawn from a wide diversity of professional
backgrounds, with many of our most well-respected judges coming from private practice. As
to the Supreme Court, Justice Louis D. Brandeis, who was known as 'the people's attorney'
for his pro bono work, spent his entire career in private practice before he was named to the
Supreme Court in 1916 by President Wilson. Justice John Harlan served in several
government posts early in his career, but the lion's share of his experience prior to his
nomination by President Eisenhower in 1954 was in private practice .... Retired Justice
Byron White, who played professional football for the Detroit Lions on the weekends while
attending Yale Law School, was in private practice in Colorado for nearly 14 years before
joining the Justice Department as deputy attorney general to Robert Kennedy.
Id.
16. Id. Rehnquist is not the only justice to register complaints about the norm of prior judicial
experience. For the comments of other Court members, see infra Part I.C.
17. Rehnquist, supra note 15.
18. For a list of these analyses, see infra Appendix.
19. See infra pp. 956-60.
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career experience. Next, in Parts II and III, we turn to the normative com-
ponents of our claim. Drawing on diverse bodies of legal and social science
literature, we explain why norms that produce homogeneous groups, in
particular the norm of prior judicial experience, are fraught with dangers.
From this analysis we extract a clear and significant policy implica-
tion. Because of problems associated with a perpetuation of the norm of
prior judicial experience, we urge the president, the Senate, and other key
players in the confirmation process, as well as the general public, to pay
greater attention to the career experiences of those they would like to serve
on the nation's highest Court. But such attention, as we explain in Part IV,
ought not result in reserving the next two, three, or four vacancies for
nominees hailing directly from private practice, legislatures, the cabinet,
and so on. Rather, it should come about by taking into account the career
experiences of justices remaining on the Court to avoid excessive duplica-
tion.
I
THE NORM OF PRIOR JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE
We base our general claim that the norm of prior judicial experience
may adversely affect the Court's ability to perform at optimal levels on
interrelated empirical and normative analyses. This Part sets forth the em-
pirical analysis, which shows that data on the career experiences of
Supreme Court nominees support two conclusions: (1) that a norm of prior
judicial experience exists, and (2) that this norm has induced unprece-
dented levels of career homogeneity on the Court. In Parts II and III, we
turn to the normative analysis of the adverse consequences that this lack of
career diversity confers on the Court's decision-making capabilities.
A. Evidence for the Existence of the Norm
The claim that a norm of prior judicial experience currently exists is
hardly novel. As early as 19592' and as recently as 2002,21 commentators
and jurists have acknowledged the grave reluctance of presidents to nomi-
nate and Senates to confirm anyone other than sitting judges (usually U.S.
court of appeals judges) to the Court.
It is not that analysts agree on all features of the norm; they surely do
not. For example, while almost all claim that its genesis lies in the 1950s
during the Eisenhower years, some suggest that the norm originated with
certain members of Congress, who, in the wake of Chief Justice
20. E.g., John R. Schmidhauser, The Justices of the Supreme Court: A Collective Portrait, 3
MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 1 (1959).
21. E.g., Rehnquist, supra note 15.
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Warren's unanimous opinion in Brown v. Board of Education,22 "bitterly
urge[d]" President Eisenhower to select "men who (would] base
decisions ... upon 'law,' not 'sociology.' ' ' 3 Because these legislators
thought that such men, at least in their eyes, were more likely to come to
the Court from federal judgeships, and not from legislatures (e.g., Hugo
Black), academia (e.g., Felix Frankfurter), or governors' mansions (e.g.,
Earl Warren), " they went so far as to propose legislation requiring that all
future appointees have at least five years of judicial experience." Others
argue that it was President Eisenhower himself who created the norm.26 On
this account, after nominating Warren as chief justice, Eisenhower deliber-
ately imposed the criterion of judicial experience to distance himself from
the overt cronyism that characterized the approach to judicial selection
taken by his immediate predecessors, Roosevelt and Truman, and also to
increase the likelihood of appointing justices who would "command the
respect, confidence, and pride of the population."2
In addition to its genesis, analysts disagree over the wisdom of the
norm. Some defend it on much the same grounds as did Eisenhower: as
possibly the best mechanism to ensure the appointment of the most capa-
ble, ethical, and qualified individuals. 8 Others are quite critical. Rehnquist,
for one, claims that a Court replete with former judges will be unable to
command respect.29 A more common complaint, however, is that the norm
serves as a vehicle for presidents and Senates to assess the political ideol-
ogy of potential candidates." Even Eisenhower, some say, created the
22. 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.l1 (1954) (citing social science studies to support its position that
segregation "generates a feeling of inferiority").
23. Schmidhauser, supra note 20, at 4 1.
24. Black, Frankfurter, and Warren were all members of the Brown Court. See Brown, 347 U.S.
at 483.
25. JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER, JUDGES AND JUSTICES 17 (1979) (citing 84 CONG. REC. 6521
(1956)).
26. See, e.g., SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES 115 (1997); YALOF, supra note 3,
at 43.
27. GOLDMAN, supra note 26, at 115. Indeed, Eisenhower apparently went so far as to make clear
that "he would use an appeals court appointment as a stepping stone to the Supreme Court." Id. In his
diary, Eisenhower recounted sharing this philosophy with Attorney General Brownell: .'I told
Brownell that if he had any ambitions to go on the Court, that we should appoint him immediately to
the vacancy now existing on the Appellate Court in New York and then when and if another vacancy
occurred on the Supreme Court, I could appoint him to it."' Id. Brownell turned down Eisenhower's
offer. Id.
28. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 42-43 (2001).
29. See Rehnquist, supra note 15.
30. See, e.g., DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 33 (2000) ("Judges and scholars perpetuate the myth of merit. The reality, however, is that
every appointment is political."); Schmidhauser, supra note 20, at 41 ("it may be properly suspected
that those who urge [the perpetuation of the norm of prior judicial experience] consciously or
subconsciously assume that 'good' judges are those who are apt to render decisions in accordance with
[their] ideological predilections .... ").
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norm out of the belief that an examination of a nominee's record as a lower
court judge would "provide an inkling of his philosophy."3
Although these debates about the norm's contours will inevitably con-
tinue, what seems beyond debate is the norm's continuing existence. No
contemporary scholar who has written on the subject would dispute Yalof's
claim that, at least since the 1950s, U.S. court of appeals judges have been
"the 'darlings' of the selection process."32
Even so, the evidence in support of the norm of prior judicial experi-
ence tends toward the anecdotal or asystematic. This need not be the case.
Though we cannot directly observe it,3" we can identify the norm's possible
manifestations and ultimately trace them against data that we can observe.
If the norm of prior judicial experience has been in effect since the
Eisenhower years, we might expect to find three particularly compelling
manifestations: (1) a majority of sitting judges among those names on con-
temporary presidential "short lists" for the Court; (2) a statistically signifi-
cant difference between the percentage of nominees who were sitting
judges before Eisenhower's first appointment in 1953 and thereafter; and
(3) a statistically significant increase over time in the percentage of Court
members who were sitting judges at the time of their nomination. As it
turns out, all three manifestations point in the same direction reflected in
the extant commentary: They are consistent with the existence of a norm
of judicial experience.
Beginning with the first manifestation-the names of persons on
presidential short lists-all modem presidents have given serious consid-
eration almost exclusively to federal judges. Ford, for example, apparently
considered well over a dozen persons, most of whom were federal judges,
before boiling down his final choices to U.S. court of appeals judges Arlin
M. Adams and John Paul Stevens.34 With only scattered exceptions, the
names on Reagan's lists for all four appointments he made to the Court
were those of sitting jurists on a U.S. court of appeals.35 The final four can-
didates on Bush Sr.'s short list to replace William Brennan were all U.S.
court of appeals judges (Edith Jones, David Souter, Laurence H.
Silberman, and Clarence Thomas), as were those for Thurgood Marshall's
seat (Clarence Thomas, Edith Jones, Jose Cabranes, and Emilio Garza).36
Clinton apparently gave consideration to several politicians such as Bruce
31. ABRAHAM, supra note 3, at 191.
32. See YALOF, supra note 3, at 170; see also text accompanying note 13.
33. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 AM. J.
POL. Sci. 362, 365 (2001) ("[N]orms 'are not directly observable' and, thus, notoriously difficult to
document-so much so that the best we can typically do is trace their manifestations .. "); see also
Gregory A. Caldeira & Christopher J.W. Zom, Of Time and Consensual Norms in the Supreme Court,
42 AM. J. POL. Sci. 874, 875 (1998).
34. ABRAHAM, supra note 3, at 275.
35. YALOF, supra note 3, at 133-67.
36. ABRAHAM, supra note 3, at 304, 310.
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Babbitt, Mario Cuomo, and George Mitchell. But like his predecessors,
most of the candidates he seriously deliberated were jurists (including
Gilbert Merritt, Jon 0. Newman, Amalya Kearse, and Richard S. Arnold),
as were his eventual nominees, U.S. court of appeals judges Stephen
Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg.37 Finally, as previously mentioned,
George W. Bush's list is replete with sitting judges.38
The presence of sitting jurists on presidential short lists is important.
It is not, however, the only possible manifestation of a norm of prior judi-
cial experience, nor is it necessarily the most convincing. After all, even if
the norm does not constrain presidents in their private thinking about the
Court, it may still constrain their public behavior. So, for example, while
Clinton contemplated tapping Babbitt (who was then the Secretary of the
Interior) for a seat on the Court, he dropped that idea when some expressed
concern about Babbitt's "lack of judicial experience."39
Accordingly, perhaps more telling signs of the norm come from the
record of those actually nominated. As noted above, two manifestations are
particularly important: (1) a change in the percentage of nominees who
were sitting judges before Eisenhower's first nomination in 1953 and
thereafter; and (2) a growth in the percentage over time of Court members
who were sitting judges at the time of their nomination. To assess the first,
we amassed data on the backgrounds of all persons nominated to the Court
by all presidents.4" As seen in Figure 1, whether we consider all nominees
or only those who were successfully appointed to the Court, we find evi-
dence consistent with the existence of a norm of judicial experience. The
anticipated statistically significant difference emerges between the judicial
backgrounds of those appointed before 1953 and thereafter 4 -- of the 121
nominations made by Eisenhower's predecessors, roughly one-third (42 of
the 121) went to persons who were sitting judges at the time of appoint-
ment; of the 27 nominations made since 1953, about three-quarters (20 of
the 27) were to sitting judges.
37. Id.; SILVERSTEIN, supra note 3, at 167-76.
38. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
39. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 3, at 170.
40. All data used here and throughout the Article are available on our website:
http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/-polisci/epstein/research/diversity.html. For this analysis and all analyses
of positions at the time of appointment, we double count associate justices nominated to serve as chief
justice (e.g., the post-1953 cohort includes Rehnquist as an associate justice and as chief justice). We
made this decision because a president could have appointed someone other than a sitting associate
justice to the chiefjustice slot (that is, a person who was not a judge at the time of nomination).
41. The Pearson Chi Square for all nominees is 14.051 (p < 0.001); for successful nominees it is
6.138 (p = 0.013). A Pearson Chi Square is a measure of statistical independence; for sufficiently large
values, one can reject the null hypothesis of independence. The p-value indicates the exact level of
statistical significance. If the p-value is lower than a threshold of Type I tolerable error (typically 5%),
then one can conclude that the relationship in the observed data is not due to chance alone and is thus
statistically significant. MORRIS H. DEGROOT & MARK J. SCHERVISH, PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS
536-37 (2002).
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Figure 1 Percentage of Nominees Holding Judgeships When Nominated
to the U.S. Supreme Court, by Era (Pre- and Post-1953) 42
A. All Nominees (N = 148)
Judge Not a Judge
Position at Time of Nomination
B. Successful Nominees (N = 112)
Judge Not a Judge
Position at Time of Nomination
Note: The dark bars represent the time period 1789-1952, ending at the nomination of Earl
Warren. The light bars cover those nominated thereafter, from 1953 to the present.
Interestingly, the seven exceptions to the general rule of prior judicial
experience in the post-Eisenhower years came early. Eisenhower himself
generated one with his 1953 nomination of Earl Warren, who was the gov-
ernor of California at the time.43 But that exception is readily explicable in
42. Data are from EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 324-31 tbl.4-9; see also supra note 40.
43. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 341 tbl.4-12.
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light of accounts suggesting that it was Warren's opinion in Brown that led
to the creation of the norm in the first place." Since the remaining six ex-
ceptions occurred during the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon years,45 we
might be tempted to conclude that the extant literature is insufficiently nu-
anced-that the norm may have had its origins in the Eisenhower years but
failed to take hold until the Ford and Reagan presidencies. This assessment
may accurately characterize the Kennedy and Johnson administrations,
both of which apparently focused more on personal and political patronage
than on prior judicial experience.46 Nixon, however, seemed to revive the
norm, or at least attempted to do so, explicitly directing his advisors to fol-
low Eisenhower's model of using prior judicial experience as a criterion
for serious consideration for the Court.47 Nixon achieved this objective
with his first two appointments, U.S. court of appeals judges Warren
Burger and Harry Blackmun, though not without difficulty. The Senate
rejected his first two nominees (U.S. court of appeals judges G. Harrold
Carswell and Clement Haynsworth) for Blackmun's eventual seat. Those
tangles with the Senate led Nixon to "forego the requirement of judicial
experience, as long as that nominee could still be confirmed."48 Even so,
most of the names seriously vetted by the Nixon administration for the next
two vacancies were sitting jurists, including Mildred Lillie, a California
court of appeals judge.49 These jurists, however, faced opposition from the
American Bar Association, which, for example, deemed Lillie unqualified
by a vote of eleven to one. As a result, Nixon moved away from the judi-
cial experience requirement and turned to Lewis Powell, an attorney in pri-
vate practice, and only through near "desperation" did he tap U.S. Assistant
Attorney General William Rehnquist. °
Although Nixon did not fully adhere to the norm of prior judicial ex-
perience, the same cannot be said of his successors. Since 1971, all ten
nominees to the Court, whether appointed or not, held judgeships at the
time of their nomination.5 As a result, Figure 2 shows a steep increase
since the 1950s in the percentage of justices who were sitting judges at the
time of their nomination. In fact, a regression of the percentage of judges
44. See supra Part I.A.
45. All three presidents appointed two nonsitting jurists. Kennedy appointed Byron White (U.S.
Deputy Attorney General) and Arthur Goldberg (U.S. Secretary of Labor); Johnson named Abe Fortas
(a lawyer in private practice) and Thurgood Marshall (U.S. Solicitor General); and Nixon nominated
Lewis Powell (a lawyer in private practice) and William Rehnquist (U.S. Assistant Attorney General).
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 335-42 tbl.4-12.
46. See YALOF, supra note 3, at 70-96.
47. Id. at 97-132.
48. Id. at ll6.
49. GOLDMAN, supra note 26, at 215-16.
50. Id.
51. Of the ten nominees, there was one nomination by Ford, five by Reagan, and two each by
Bush Sr. and Clinton. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 335-42 tbl.4-12.
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on time for the years subsequent to 1953 (illustrated in Panel A) produces a
slope coefficient that is positive and significant; 2 for a regression for the
period before 1953 the relationship is statistically insignificant. 3 In accord
with various accounts of the norm of prior judicial experience, the growth
has been uneven. 4 What has increased precipitously and significantly since
1953 is the percentage of nominees coming from federal courts (Panel B).
The percentage coming from state courts (Panel C), on the other hand, has
remained relatively flat.
Figure 2 Percentage of justices with judgeships When Nominated,
by Year (1789-2001) 55
A. Justices Serving as State or Federal Judges When Appointed
1iat 1020 1840 186 190 1 DOD 1920 1 4D 1960 198D 200
Year
Note The vertical line corresponds to the year 1869, when a separate circuit court of appeals
was established.
52. A linear regression model quantifies the relationship between two interval-level variables.
JOHN Fox, APPLIED REGRESSION ANALYSIS, LINEAR MODELS, AND RELATED METHODS (1997). In this
case, the percentage of justices serving as judges is regressed on time. A statistically significant slope
coefficient suggests that there is a linear trend in time that differs from zero. Here, the coefficient is
significant with p < 0.0001. See supra note 41 (explaining the significance of p-values).
53. p = 0.0872. See supra note 41 (explaining the significance of p-values).
54. See GOLDMAN, supra note 26; YALOF, supra note 3.
55. Data are from EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 324-31 tbl.4-9. See also supra note 40.
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Figure 2 (cont'd) Percentage of Justices with
Nominated, by Year (1789-2001)
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Judgeships When
2. Justices Serving as Federal Court Judges When Appointed
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Note: The vertical line corresponds to the year 1869, when a separate circuit court of appeals
was established.
But should we attribute the observed growth in the percentage of
nominees from the federal bench to the existence of a norm of prior judi-
cial experience? We raise this question because another obvious explana-
tion presents itself: the lack of a separate circuit court of appeals judiciary
until 1869.56 Accordingly, if presidents desired to appoint jurists to the
Court before then, their alternatives were limited to federal district court or
56. The Judiciary Act of 1869 provided for a separate circuit judiciary of nine members. See
Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, § 2, 16 Stat. 44, 44-45 (1869) (repealed 1911). The establishment of
circuit courts of appeals (renamed courts of appeals in 1948) did not come until the Judiciary Act of
1891. See Evarts Act, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826, 826-27 (1891) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
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state court judges. Early on, presidents generally opted for the latter, with
appointments going to state judges at all levels. 7 President John Quincy
Adams's nomination of U.S. district court judge Robert Trimble in 1826
marked the first departure from this general pattern,58 but it was not until
the turn of the last century when presidents made almost a complete break
with the past by nearly exclusively appointing federal judges at the expense
of their state counterparts.
That this break coincides with the creation of separate circuit courts
suggests that the establishment of these bodies probably plays some role in
explaining the trends we observe in Figure 2. However, the mere existence
of a new pool of jurists cannot explain why presidents stopped looking to
the state benches. Nor can it capture the steep upward trend (illustrated in
Panels A and B) that began in the 1950s and continues today. Before 1953,
only 16% of all justices hailed directly from the U.S. courts of appeals;
after that date, 43% came from these positions.5 9
The data, therefore, seem to confirm scholarly works claiming that the
norm of judicial experience originated in the mid-twentieth century. And
while we cannot positively say whether those origins lay with Eisenhower
or Congress, by all indications and in accord with existing commentary,
presidents have now created what appears to be a norm of prior federal ju-
dicial experience.
B. Career Homogeneity Resulting from the Norm
It is one thing to document behavior consistent with the existence of a
norm of prior judicial experience. It is quite another to show, in line with
the second part of our argument, that the norm has worked to induce un-
precedented career homogeneity on the Court. Certainly Figure 2 suggests
that the percentage of justices who came to the Court directly from one of
the nation's other benches has grown precipitously over time to the point
where contemporary justices are no longer a heterogeneous group. But
Figure 2 does not rule out two alternative explanations for these data. First,
a justice's occupation at the time of appointment, which we have used thus
far to gauge the existence of the norm of prior judicial experience, may not
capture important features of career diversity. Those justices serving as
judges when appointed could actually be a heterogeneous group, perhaps
having served as legislators, government attorneys, high-level executive
officials, and other similar positions before joining a state or federal bench.
If this were the case, it would be more accurate to say that the norm's
57. Appointees from the highest benches of state courts included John Blair, Jr. (Virginia
Supreme Court justice), and Thomas Todd (Kentucky chief justice). Appointees from lower-level
judgeships included Samuel Chase (Maryland General Court judge) and William Johnson (South
Carolina Common Pleas judge). EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 335-42, 336 tbl.4-12.
58. Id. at 336 tbl.4-12.
59. p < 0.0001. See supra note 41 (explaining the significance of p-values).
2003]
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
primary impact was not to produce homogeneity, but to limit the pool of
potential nominees to sitting judges. The second alternative explanation
could be that other sorts of career experience norms may have been in ef-
fect, leading presidents and Senates to appoint only attorneys who, at the
time of their nomination, worked in the private sector or served in the ex-
ecutive branch of the government. Thus, if the Court has traditionally
lacked diversity of career experience, we would also be unable to say that
the norm has induced unprecedented career homogeneity.
In light of these possible alternative explanations, we cannot end our
analysis with a documentation of a rise in the percentage of sitting judges.
To determine whether the norm has generated a unique lack of career het-
erogeneity on the Court, we must also consider trends in the types of posi-
tions held by nominees and in their overall career experience. We begin
with the occupations of the judges at the time of appointment, and then
turn to their career path.
1. Occupation at Time ofAppointment
When presidents present their Supreme Court nominees to the public,
they often discuss their candidates' current occupation at length. Consider
President Clinton's statement announcing the nomination of Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, and notice that two of the three reasons he offered for his choice
center on Ginsburg's service on the U.S. court of appeals:
After careful reflection, I am proud to nominate for associate
Justice of the Supreme Court Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg of the
United States Court of Appeals to the District of Columbia. I will
send her name to the Senate to fill the vacancy created by Justice
White's retirement. As I told Judge Ginsburg last night when I
called to ask her to accept the nomination, I decided on her for
three reasons.
First, in her years on the bench, she has genuinely distinguished
herself as one of our nation's best judges, progressive in outlook,
wise in judgment, balanced and fair in her opinions.
Second, over the course of a lifetime in her pioneering work in
behalf of the women of this country, she has compiled a truly
historic record of achievement in the finest traditions of American
law and citizenship.
And, finally, I believe that in the years ahead, she will be able to be
a force for consensus-building on the Supreme Court, just as she
has been on the Court of Appeals, so that our judges can become an
instrument of our common unity in the expression of their fidelity
to the Constitution.6 °
60. Transcript of President's Announcement and Judge Ginsburg's Remarks, N.Y. TIMES, June
15, 1993, at A24.
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Clinton is not atypical. Virtually every recent president has, at the
time of nomination, placed emphasis on his candidate's judicial position
and related qualifications.
We therefore begin our analysis of career diversity with an examina-
tion of the positions held by nominees when tapped by the president. Spe-
cifically, our task is to explore the possibility that the norm of judicial
experience merely supplanted other occupational norms (such as norms of
only nominating legislators or attorneys in private practice), which also
may have led to Courts that lacked career diversity.
To investigate this possibility, we sorted the positions held by all
nominees at the time of their appointment into six categories:61 (1) profes-
sors, (2) judges, (3) legislators, (4) nonlegal members of the executive
branch (i.e., in a position that does not require legal training),6 2 (5) gov-
ernment attorneys, or (6) attorneys in private practice. 63 Then, by calculat-
ing the percentage of justices falling into each category on every Court
since 1789, we created an indicator of diversity that would enable us to
assess the level of career heterogeneity both in the past and the present.
Each nominee is classified into one of these six categories at the time of
61. Over the past few decades, scores of scholars and other commentators have developed
numerous ways to classify the prior occupations of jurists. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics
and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257,
273-74 (1995); James J. Brudney et al., Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying the Social
Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIo ST. L.J. 1675, 1704-05 (1999); Sheldon
Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
491, 496-501 (1975); Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts
Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 84-85 (2001); John R.
Schmidhauser, Stare Decisis, Dissent, and the Backgrounds of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the
United States, 14 U. TORONTO L.J. 194, 200 (1962); Daniel M. Schneider, Empirical Research on
Judicial Reasoning: Statutory Interpretation in Federal Tax Cases, 31 N.M. L. REV. 325, 334-36
(2001); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of
Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1420-21 (1998); C. Neal Tate & Roger Handberg, Time
Binding and Theory Building in Personal Attribute Models of Supreme Court Voting Behavior, 1916-
88, 35 AM. J. POL. ScL 460, 470-71 (1991); S. Sidney Ulmer, Social Background as an Indicator to the
Votes of Supreme Court Justices in Criminal Cases: 194 7-1956 Terms, 17 Am. J. POL. Sci. 622, 623-
24 (1973). Some of these scholars' classifications are simple dichotomies, such as whether the justice
served as a jurist before coming to the Court or not; others are more detailed. Given the central
concerns of our research we opted for a more detailed scheme.
62. See supra note 11. See also infra note 63.
63. To elaborate, "professors" are justices who held positions in universities or colleges at the
time of appointment; "judges" are justices who served as international, federal, or state jurists at the
time of appointment; "legislators" are justices who served as federal or state legislators at the time of
appointment; "nonlegal members of the executive branch" are justices who held elected executive (e.g.,
governor) or appointed positions (e.g., a seat in the U.S. cabinet, an ambassadorship, or a position on an
executive commission or agency) that do not call for a legal background (e.g., a government attorney
would not fall into this category), see supra note t 1; "government attorneys" are justices who worked
as lawyers at the local (e.g., district attorney), state (e.g., state attorney general), or federal (e.g., U.S.
attorney, U.S. Solicitor General) level at the time of appointment; "attorneys in private practice" are
justices who were in private practice at the time of appointment.
2003]
CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 91:903
appointment. The information is encoded in a variable that takes one, and
only one, of these six categories.
Figure 3 displays this indicator in gray tones. For example, of the nine
justices serving in 1950, none were in private practice at the time of ap-
pointment, three (33%) worked in the U.S. Justice Department as govern-
ment attorneys,64 two (22%) were nonlegal members of the executive
branch,65 two (22%) were legislators, 66 one (I 1%) was a judge,67 and one
(11%) was a professor.68 Generally, the more shades of gray, the more di-
verse the Court; the fewer shades, the less diverse.
Figure 3 Percentage of justices Holding Various Positions When
Appointed, by Year (1789-2001)69
C3 d
I I I I I
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Note: Moving from the top region (white) to the
bottom region (black) the categories are: professors,
judges, legislators, nonlegal members of the
executive branch, government attorneys, and
attorneys in private practice. See supra note 63 for a




64. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 335-42 tbl.4-12 (Justices Reed, Jackson, and Clark).
65. Id. (Justices Douglas and Vinson).
66. Id. (Justices Black and Burton).
67. Id. (Justice Minton).
68. Id. (Justice Frankfurter).
69. The data here were derived from EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 335-42 tbl.4-12. See also
supra note 40.
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Using the variation in gray tones as an indicator, it is easy to see the
growing homogeneity of the Court, at least with respect to the basic occu-
pational categories displayed in Figure 3. While multiple shades exist for
almost all prior periods, between Justice Powell's retirement in 1987 and
1993 we see only two: the lighter gray representing judges and the darker
gray representing government attorneys. Beginning in 1994, homogeneity
reaches a new level, with all members of the Court attaining their current
position via a judgeship.y
Cutting the data into different or even finer slices does nothing to
change this basic picture of contemporary homogeneity. Consider, for ex-
ample, Figure 4, which depicts the percentage of justices who held political
positions on each Court by year, either as legislators (Panel A) or as mem-
bers of the executive branch in capacities that did not require law degrees
(Panels B and C).7 Beginning with legislators in Panel A, we see that over
the course of the last two centuries or so, justices coming directly from
elected positions in the nation's legislatures have never dominated the
Court: They composed about 38% of the Court during their peak from
1844 to 1845. Nonetheless, those justices serving in the U.S. Congress at
the time of their appointment maintained some presence until Hugo Black
retired in 1971.72 Since Black's departure, no president has nominated a
sitting member of Congress or, for that matter, a state legislator to the
Court.73
70. Until his nomination as chief justice in 1986, we code Rehnquist as a "Government
Attorney;" after his promotion, we code him as a "Judge." For our rationale, see supra note 40.
71. See supra note 11. See also supra note 63.
72. Black was not the last sitting member of Congress selected to serve on the Court. After his
appointment in 1937, Roosevelt nominated Byrnes in 1941, and Truman named Burton in 1945. But
Black outlasted both. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 340-41.
73. The last sitting member of a state legislature appointed to the Court was Benjamin Curtis in
1851. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 337 tbl.4-12.
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Percentage of Justices Holding Political Positions When
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Figure 4 (cont'd) Percentage of Justices Holding Political Positions When
Appointed, by Year (1789-2001), Part I
C. Justices Serving as Appointed Officials in the Executive Branch When Appointed
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Panels B and C of Figure 4 show a similar decline in the percentage of
justices holding nonlegal positions in the executive branch at the time of
appointment. Although it is clear from Panel B that very few came to the
bench directly from elected executive positions,75 historically presidents
have drawn numerous nominees from their appointed cabinets or commis-
sions, including John Marshall (Secretary of State), Smith Thompson
(Secretary of the Navy), Lucius Q.C. Lamar (Secretary of the Interior), and
William 0. Douglas (Securities and Exchange Commissioner).76 Indeed,
over 50% of the sitting justices came to the Court from these sorts of posi-
tions between 1829 and 1835.77 That era is long past. Panels B and C and a
simple regression of the percentage of justices holding either elected or
appointed positions demonstrate that there has been a marked and signifi-
cant decrease in appointments made directly from the executive branch.78
Moreover, we observe a complete leveling of the lines in Panels B and C,
indicating a striking reluctance on the part of presidents, at least since
Lyndon Johnson tapped Arthur Goldberg in 1962, to nominate persons
serving in an appointed or elected nonlegal executive position.
75. The only justices who came directly from elected state office were William Paterson (New
Jersey Governor appointed in 1793), Charles Evan Hughes (New York Governor appointed in 1910),
and Earl Warren (California Governor appointed in 1953). EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 335, 339,
341 tbl.4-12.
76. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 312-23 tbl.4-8.
77. Id. Specifically, four of the seven justices serving during this period (Marshall, Duvall,
Thompson, and McLean) fell into this category.
78. The slope of a regression of the percentages (taken together) in Panels B and C on time is
statistically significant at p < 0.0001. See supra note 41 (explaining the significance of p-values).
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Figure 5 summarizes the data in a slightly different form. Panel A
shows the percentage of justices who held elected positions (either in the
legislative or executive branches) at the time of their appointment; Panel B
illustrates the percentage who served in a nonlegal executive position or as
a legislator. In both panels, a downward trend exists,7 9 but it is the tail of
the panels that tells the most interesting story: Since Douglas's departure
in 1975, presidents have not nominated any candidate who held a political
position at the time of appointment. As Panel B demonstrates, this stands
in marked contrast to the practices of the previous 186 years.
Percentage of Justices Holding Political Positions When
Appointed, by Year (1789-2001), Part 1180
A. Justices Holding Any Elected Position (Executive or Legislative) When Appointed
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79. The slope of a regression of the measures in Figure 5, Panels A and B on time is statistically
significant at p < 0.0001. See supra note 41 (explaining the significance of p-values).
80. The data here were derived from EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 312-23 tbl.4-8. See also
supra note 40.
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Figure 6 further shows a decline in nominees holding various types of
positions in the legal community immediately before their appointment.
Whether we consider the percentage of those serving as government law-
yers (Panel A), practicing in the private sector (Panel B), or holding aca-
demic positions (Panel C), the percentages flatten out. Panel B is of special
interest. With the exception of the current justices and those sitting for the
twenty-five year period between 1940 and 1965 (until Fortas's appoint-
ment), private practitioners have always had some representation on the
Court. During one short period (1874-79), they actually held six of nine
seats; but since Powell's departure in 1987, the number has been zero.
Figure 6 Percentage of Justices Holding Legal Positions When
Appointed, by Year (1789-2001)8"
A. Justices Serving as Government Lawyers When Appointed
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81. The data here were derived from EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 335-42 tbl.4-12. See also
supra note 40.
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Figure 6 (cont'd) Percentage of Justices Holding Legal Positions
When Appointed, by Year (1789-2001)
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In short, presidents are no longer searching the corridors of private
law firms for nominees. Nor are they looking in the halls of academia, the
offices of prosecutors, or the floors of legislatures. These days, as Figure 2
makes clear, the only site they seem to visit is the courthouse-and only
the federal courthouse at that.
This behavior is precisely what we would anticipate if a norm of prior
judicial experience were in effect. But that is not all the data tell us. Given
the overall patterns of diversity we observe in Figures 3 through 6 (at least
until the contemporary era), the data also suggest that the norm of prior
judicial experience did not supplant an equivalent norm, such as one that
would lead presidents to nominate only attorneys in private practice or leg-
islators. Rather, the sort of occupational norm in effect today, with
C -
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occasional exceptions, is rather unique to the last half of the twentieth cen-
tury. Thus, contemporary nominees reflect a degree of career homogeneity
that is entirely unprecedented.
2. Homogeneity of Career Paths
Though instructive, the data we have presented thus far are limited.
They deal only with the position held at the time of ascension to the Court
and may thus overlook other critical career experiences. To see this, we
need only consider Sandra Day O'Connor. At the time of her appointment
as an associate justice, she was-like all other appointees since 1971-a
judge. But her resume also includes service as a state legislator, a state as-
sistant attorney, and a private practice attorney.
Is Justice O'Connor representative? That is, is it typical for justices
who come directly to the Court from other judgeships to possess a wide
range of career experiences? Or are they more likely to have followed a
"judicial track" early in their careers, perhaps initially serving in positions
we now associate as steppingstones to the nation's judiciary (e.g., working
as a state prosecutor or as an attorney in the U.S. Department of Justice) 2
and then moving directly to the bench, thereby developing less varied re-
sumes? If the former holds, we cannot say that the norm of prior judicial
experience induces career homogeneity; if it is the latter, we would have
additional evidence of the impact of the norm.
To sort through these alternatives, we gathered a wealth of informa-
tion on the career experiences of the justices. To the extent that these data
focus attention on the complete professional occupational histories of
Court members and not simply the position they held at the time of ap-
pointment, they differ from the data we presented above. But our reason for
examining them is identical: to determine whether the norm of prior judi-
cial experience has induced an unusual degree of homogeneity on the
Court. Our approach to making this determination also follows from the
previous section. We examine whether justices serving in each Court era
possessed any experience in the following categories: (1) attorneys in
82. Data in Sheldon Goldman & Elliot E. Slotnick, Introduction: Clinton's Judicial Legacy, 84
JUDICATURE 227, 244, 249 (2001), show that 41.3% of Clinton's 305 appointees to the U.S. district
courts had prosecutorial experience; the figure for Clinton's 61 appointees to the U.S. courts of appeals
is 37.7%. Only 28.9% of his district court and 29.5% of his court of appeals appointees lacked either
prosecutorial or judicial experience. Id. See also Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the
Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U.
L. REV. 759, 781 (1995) ("One of the most frequently traveled routes to the state trial bench is through
prosecutors' offices."); Louis Fisher, Public Service as a Calling, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1185, 1202 (1998)
("The solicitor generalship has often been a steppingstone to the Supreme Court."); Brad Snyder, How
the Conservatives Canonized Brown v. Board of Education, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 383, 411 (2000) ("In
order to become the government's advocate before the Supreme Court, Marshall gave up his life tenure
as a Second Circuit judge, took a $4,500 pay cut, and moved to Washington, D.C. for a job that was
generally considered a stepping stone to the Supreme Court ... ").
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private practice, (2) legislators, (3) nonlegal members of the executive
branch, (4) professors, (5) government attorneys, or (6) judges.8 3 Figures 7
through 9 display the results.
Figure 7 summarizes the justices' experience in private practice, spe-
cifically the average number of years they worked as an attorney in a pri-
vate law firm. We use years rather than percentages as in the previous
Section for two reasons. First, over the entire course of the Court's history
all but two justices, Breyer and Ginsburg, worked at one time or another in
private practice. Accordingly, percentages would not reveal much beyond
what we already know. Second, even if the percentages varied from one
Court era to the next, using them to summarize law firm experience could
produce illusory results. Because the percentages fail to take into account
the number of years of experience, they only consider whether the justices
had any exposure to private practice. Whether a justice spent six years in
the private sector, as did Antonin Scalia, or nearly forty, as did Louis
Brandeis, strikes us and other observers84 as a critical difference.
83. See supra note 63 (providing a description of these occupational categories). In the previous
analyses, the number of justices was 112 because we double counted associate justices who became
chief justices-a sensible decision since we were interested in "position held at the time of
appointment." See supra note 40 (providing more details on this decision). Here, because our focus is
on the totality of professional career experience, we do not double count those associate justices.
84. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 61, at 335; Rehnquist, supra note 15.
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Figure 7 Mean Number of Years Justices Worked in Private
Practice Before Their Appointment to the Court,
by Year (1789-2001)85
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In looking at Figure 7, we observe the absence of any clear linear
trend-the line does not move in a monotonic (linear) fashion over time.
Instead, we see a nonlinear pattern resembling an inverted U, such that the
mean number of years of private-practice experience through the 1850s is
about 14; between 1850 and 1940, that figure climbs to 19.5 (the zenith in
1938 is 25 years) only to fall rather dramatically to 10.7 in the 1940s and
remain comparatively low for the ensuing decades as the norm of prior ju-
dicial experience began to take hold. A short-lived increase in the mean
occurs between 1972 and 1986. However, because this increase was largely
due to Lewis Powell's contribution of thirty-eight years in private practice,
his departure lowered the mean once again.
How might we explain this pattern? To what extent does it reflect par-
ticular historical events (such as the Industrial Revolution or the growth of
the economy in the 1920s), presidential preferences, or other factors?
These are interesting questions deserving of serious consideration. But far
more relevant and revealing is that, at a mean of 8.2 years of private prac-
tice, the current Court has reached a nadir-at no other point in U.S. his-
tory has a group of sitting justices possessed so few years of experience
practicing in the private sector. Compared to the mean for the period up
until 1953 (16.4 years), this 8.2-year figure indicates that the justices of
85. Data derived from EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 272-80 tbl.4-6. See also supra note 40.
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this Court worked an average of half the number of years in private prac-
tice than their predecessors appointed before the onset of the norm.
Not only do recent Courts lack private-sector experience, justices lack
public-sector experience as well. As Figure 8 indicates, this lack of
experience is particularly true with regard to political positions. Panel A
presents an overwhelming historical trend: presidents and Senates have
become increasingly less likely to view elected, representative bodies as
potential sources for Supreme Court appointments. To illustrate this, we
need only consider that up until 1953, the year of Eisenhower's nomination
of Earl Warren, at least one-third of the justices sitting on virtually all
Courts had served as a state or federal legislator.86 For a full decade be-
tween 1826 and 1836, every member on the Court had held such a posi-
tion; and, even as late as 1953, the percentage hovered around 44%. By
1958 it dropped to 11%, and by 1971, upon Hugo Black's retirement, none
had legislative experience. That changed with Justice O'Connor's ap-
pointment in 1981, but only marginally so relative to all other Courts.8 7
Thus, the latter part of the twentieth century witnessed a marked decline in
the willingness of presidents to nominate former state or federal legislators
to the bench.
Figure 8 Percentage of Justices with Political Experience Before Their
Appointment to the Court, by Year (1789-2001)88
A. Justices Serving as Legislators Before Their Appointment
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86. An exception to this general rule is the fifteen-year period between 1925 and 1940, when two
of the nine justices (22%) had previously been elected to a legislature.
87. O'Connor's experience in the Arizona state legislature puts her well in line with history.
Presidents have been more likely to tap justices with state legislative backgrounds than those who had
served in Congress. But that distinction is of far less interest than the overall pattern revealed in Figure
8, Panel A.
88. Data derived from EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 312-23 tbl.4-8. See also supra note 40.
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Figure 8 (cont'd) Percentage of Justices with Political Experience Before
Their Appointment to the Court, by Year (1789-2001)
9. Justices Serving in Appointed Executive Positions Before Their Appointment
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That same reluctance seems to characterize presidents' approach to
potential nominees who previously held jobs in the executive branch that
did not require formal legal training-whether as elected (e.g., governor,
mayor) or appointed (e.g., cabinet secretary, agency member) officials.
First, as presented in Figure 8, Panel B, the percentage of justices who held
an appointed executive position took a downward turn after reaching a high
point of 57% between 1830 and 1835.89 Although it fell to 0% in 1881
(with the departure of Nathan Clifford), Roosevelt and Truman appointees
(including William 0. Douglas, a member of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and Fred Vinson, a U.S. Secretary of the Treasury) helped to
89. Between 1830 and 1835, four of the seven sitting justices previously served as nonlegal
members of the executive branch: Justices Gabriel Duvall (former U.S. Comptroller of the Treasury),
John Marshall (former U.S. Secretary of State), John McClean (former U.S. Postmaster General), and
Smith Thompson (former U.S. Secretary of the Navy).
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increase the percentage to 33.3% between 1946 and 1952. But once the
norm of prior judicial experience attached during most of the 1970s and
1980s, it again declined to 0%. Bush Sr.'s selection of Clarence Thomas,
former chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, added
diversity to the Court on this dimension, but the current percentage (11%,
or one of nine justices) is still below the overall mean (23%) for the period
before 1953.
Figure 8, Panel C, tells a different, more meandering story. For long
periods in the nineteenth century, at least one sitting member on every
Court had previously been elected to a nonlegal executive office; the per-
centage reached as high as 38% (three of eight justices) in 1845,90 and hov-
ered at 33% (three of nine justices) for the period between 1846 and 1850.
It fell to 0% between 1888 and 1909, only to rise to 22% in the mid-1940s.
But once again the norm of judicial experience took hold. For the last fif-
teen years, not one sitting justice has been previously elected to an execu-
tive office that did not require legal training. During only three other times
in the Court's history has this been the case, with the most recent period,
1916-1920, lasting for a considerably shorter time than the current one.9
Even if we consider elected executive experience in tandem with ser-
vice as a legislator, contemporary Courts stand out for their lack of career
diversity. Over the course of the entire Court's history, 60 of the 108
justices (56.6%) came to the bench with some elected political experience,
either at the federal or state level, or via executive or legislative positions.92
But a healthy portion of those served early in the Court's history, when it
was not rare for as many as two-thirds of the Court to have previously
faced the electorate. Between 1826 and 1836, the proportion was even
higher, with all twelve justices who served during this time having experi-
ence as elected officials.93 After that high-water mark, a rather steady de-
cline occurred until the percentage (roughly) leveled off at 44% until 1957,
when it dropped again to 33%. Once presidents and Senates began adher-
ing to the norm of judicial experience, the percentage fell even further. But
never has it been as low as presently, with only Justice O'Connor having
prior elected political experience.
90. This high percentage was occasioned by the overlapping services of Justices James M.
Wayne (former Mayor of Savannah), Peter Daniel (former Lieutenant Governor of Virginia), and Levi
Woodbury (former Governor of New Hampshire). EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 312-23 tbl.4-8.
91. The three periods where the Court lacked this type of career diversity were 1806-1834, 1888-
1909, and 1916-1920.
92. We do not include elected judicial positions here.
93. Seven justices served in the U.S. Congress, five served in state legislatures, and five of the
twelve served in both. Justices John Marshall, Duvall, Story, McClean, Baldwin, Wayne, and Barbour
were in the U.S. Congress. Justices Washington, John Marshall, W. Johnson, Duvall, Story, Thompson,
Trimble, Wayne, Taney, and Barbour were in state legislatures. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 312-23
tbl.4-8.
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Overall, the panels in Figure 8 tell an interesting story. During the
Court's first 150 years, it appears that presidents and Senates sought to ap-
point justices with some background in politics-whether as members of
Congress (e.g., Harold Burton and Oliver Ellsworth), mayors (e.g., Salmon
Chase, Peter Daniel, and Ward Hunt), or cabinet secretaries or their func-
tional equivalent (e.g., John Jay and Fred Vinson).94 At the very least, the
presence of such experience did not sink a nomination.
However, the career profile of justices has markedly and significantly
changed since 1952."5 Between 1789 and 1952, the mean percentage of
justices with some political background, either in legislative or executive
politics, hovered around 65%. Since 1952, that figure has dropped to 34%.
Several explanations for this decline may exist,96 but surely the norm of
judicial experience is chief among them. Simply put, those tapped to serve
directly from one of the nation's benches have, in general, lacked the ex-
perience in politics and in the private practice of law that was so character-
istic of those appointed before the norm took effect.
What contemporary justices do possess is experience in jobs we now
typically consider steppingstones to state and federal judiciaries.97 Those
with backgrounds in legal academia, government legal offices, and federal
or state courtrooms now populate the Court. As Figure 9 highlights, the
percentages of justices with these types of career experiences are increas-
ing. Consider Panel A, which shows the percentage of justices with a back-
ground in academia. Overall a relatively small number of justices have
possessed such experience: 29 of the 108 justices (26.9%). But, if we con-
sider only those justices coming to the bench after 1950, that percentage
increases to 43%, or 9 of the 21 justices. Moreover, while the trend toward
appointing justices who worked as law professors seems to predate the es-
tablishment of the norm of prior judicial experience, this trend has intensi-
fied since the 1950s. Before 1953, those appointed to the bench with
experience in academia were largely fly-by-night "professors"-those who
did one or two brief stints in one of the nation's law schools.98 But, with
the onset of the norm of judicial experience in the 1950s, sitting Courts
have housed justices with an average of nearly five years of service in U.S.
law schools, as compared to only two years of experience during the previ-
ous 150 years.99
94. Id.
95. p < 0.0001. See supra note 41 (explaining the significance of p-values).
96. See Schmidhauser, supra note 20 (offering some possibilities); see also JOHN R.
SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT: ITS POLITICS, PERSONALITIES, AND PROCEDURES 44-47 (1960).
97. See supra note 82.
98. There are, of course, several notable exceptions: See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
99. The difference between the two periods is statistically significant (p = 0.008). See supra note
41 (explaining the significance of p-values).
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Figure 9 Percentage of Justices with Experience in Positions
Necessitating Legal Training Before Their Appointment to
the Court, by Year (1789-2001)'0'
A. Justices Working as Law Professors Before Their Appointment
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100. Data derived from EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 300-09 tbl.4-6, 312-23 tbl.4-8. See also
supra note 40.
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Figure 9 (cont'd) Percentage of Justices with Experience in Positions
Necessitating Legal Training Before Their
Appointment to the Court, by Year (1789-2001)
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The current Court, reflecting the cumulative effect of the norm of
prior judicial experience, is pushing the percentages in Figure 9 to new
highs. It contains three former law professors-Justices Breyer, Scalia, and
Ginsburg-who toiled for a total of forty-two years at Harvard (Breyer),
Chicago (Scalia), and Rutgers and Columbia (Ginsburg). Their presence
brings the mean percentage of years in academia to a near record level at
7.7 years. Only during the period between 1939 and 1945, when the Court
was populated by the likes of Harlan Fiske Stone (twenty-four years at
Columbia as Professor and Dean), Felix Frankfurter (twenty-seven years at
Harvard), and William Douglas (eight years at Yale and Columbia), was
the mean higher (10 years in 1943 and 1944).1o l
The current Court is likewise on its way to breaking historical records
for the percentage of its members with experience working in public sector
jobs that require specific legal training. These jobs, such as U.S. attorneys,
district attorneys, and legal counsel to various government agencies, have
101. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 300-09 tbl.4-6.
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long been regarded as steppingstones to the nation's judiciary. Over the
years, 46 of the 108 justices have come to the Court with such experience.
What that percentage masks, however, is the uneven distribution over time
of the percentage of sitting justices who have worked in law-related gov-
ernment jobs. Rather, as Figure 9, Panel B, shows, the percentage overall
has grown significantly and precipitously over time.' Since 1988, all but
two sitting members (Ginsburg and Kennedy) have served in government
positions requiring a background in law. And while the 2002 Court does
not represent the height of this trend-the percentage of current justices
who once worked as government attorneys (78%) is lower than it was from
1939 to 1942 (89%)-it is quite close to this zenith. If a president filled a
vacancy created by the departure of, for example, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
with a former member of, for example, the Department of
Justice, the percentage will equal the 1939-42 figure.
If the data we have presented thus far suggest that the norm of prior
judicial experience has induced an unusual degree of homogeneity on con-
temporary Courts, the evidence displayed in Figure 9, Panels C and D, vir-
tually clinches the case. These Panels directly examine prior judicial
experience, and they lead to precisely the same results as our previous
analyses in Figure 2 of the positions held by justices at the time of their
nomination. While a majority of the 108 justices came to the bench with
service on other courts, never in our history has such a large percentage of
sitting justices concurrently possessed such experience; and only once
before, from 1912 to 1913, has the mean number of years of prior judicial
service exceeded the current average of 9.2 years.0 3
Moreover, as Figure 10 shows, diversity is minimal even within the
narrow category of prior judicial experience. No longer are presidents, by
and large, drawing on nominees with experience on a state bench (Panel
A). Instead, they are turning, with increasing regularity since the 1950s, to
those who have served on a federal court (Panel B). It should hardly come
as a surprise that at no other point in U.S. history have so many justices
sitting together spent at least part of their career on a federal court. Not
only has the current Court reached record levels on the percentage of sit-
ting members with prior federal judicial experience, but it has also sur-
passed all its predecessors for the mean number of years of service. On
average, members of this Court have served 7.2 years as federal court
judges, which is exactly four times the mean across the entire series (1.8
years).
102. p < 0.0001. See supra note 41 (explaining the significance of p-values).
103. From 1912 to 1913, the mean number of years of prior judicial service was 10.7 years. But
even that figure is a bit deceptive since it was largely Justices Lurton and Holmes, with their forty-plus
years of experience on judicial tribunals, who drove up the mean. For the current Court, "years of
experience" is far more evenly distributed, as indicated by the relatively low standard deviation of 4.9
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C. Discussion
According to political scientist Henry J. Abraham,
Bills are continually introduced that would require future nominees
to the Supreme Court to have upward of five years of experience
on lower court benches. In the 89th Congress, and again in the
91st, for example, thirteen bills of this type were sponsored by
members on both sides of the aisle in both houses of Congress. But
all of these measures have failed to be enacted.' 5
While the supporters of these bills have lost their battles, they seem to
have won the war. Based on our data, it seems that a requirement of prior
104. Data derived from EPSTEIN ET Al., supra note 4, at 324-31 tbl.4-9. See also supra note 40.
105. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS
OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE 62 (1998).
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judicial experience has become a norm. Before 1953, the percentage of
justices coming directly from the U.S. courts of appeals was, on average,
just 16%; since 1953, it has increased significantly to 43%.116 Over thirty
years have elapsed since anyone lacking judicial experience has ascended
to the Court, and it has been over twenty since anyone has reached the
Court who has not previously served as a federal appellate judge." 7 More-
over, not only does the norm of prior judicial experience exist, it has also
worked to induce unprecedented levels of career homogeneity on the
Court. At one time, justices with a wide range of experiences, whether in
the private or public sector, populated the nation's highest bench. Before
the 1950s, it was not unusual to find, for example, former senators and
mayors working side-by-side with those who served in presidential cabi-
nets, worked in private practice, sat on one of the nation's courts, lectured
in a law school, or prosecuted cases for the government. But no longer.
Owing at least in part to the establishment and maintenance of the norm of
prior judicial experience, only the latter three categories of justices-
former judges, law school professors, and government attorneys-can be
found on contemporary Courts.
Why the norm of judicial experience has developed is a matter of de-
bate,'l8 and whether it will persist is a matter of speculation. What we do
know is that George W. Bush's short list for potential Supreme Court
nominees comprising U.S. court of appeals judges will perpetuate the
norm. It also seems that Bush has already made nominations to the U.S.
courts of appeals (e.g., Michael McConnell to the Tenth Circuit) with an
eye toward elevating them to the high Court. 9
Such perpetuation of the norm of judicial experience will inevitably
earn applause from some commentators and condemnation from others.
Recall Chief Justice Rehnquist's argument that further application of the
norm will lead to Courts that closely resemble tribunals in civil law socie-
ties that have chosen to set their ordinary judiciary apart as a distinct pro-
fession-one separate even from the practice of law."' Germany provides
a case in point. In order to become a judge in that country, one must be a
university graduate with the equivalent of an undergraduate major in law,
pass with exceptionally high marks a set of professional examinations, un-
dergo several years of training that combine further study with
106. p < 0.0001. See supra note 41 (explaining the significance of p-values).
107. Rehnquist, appointed in 1971, was the last justice who lacked state or federal judicial
experience upon ascension to the Court. O'Connor, appointed in 1981, was the last justice who did not
serve as a U.S. court of appeals judge before joining the Court. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at
324-31 tbl.4-9.
108. See supra Part I.A.
109. Eisenhower apparently followed the same practice. See supra note 27.
110. See WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., COURTS, JUDGES, AND POLITICS 137 (2002). See also supra
note 16 and accompanying text.
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apprenticeship, and finally sustain another set of rigorous examinations
administered by the government.' Once in the judicial profession, judges
follow career paths similar to civil servants, moving slowly up the hierar-
chy from less important to more important courts if they receive good fit-
ness reports from senior jurists."2
To Rehnquist, these systems are troublesome because they do "not
command the respect and enjoy the independence of ours.""' 3 Although
Rehnquist cites no data to support this claim, he might have bolstered his
point by examining the practices of European civil law countries that often
appoint "professional judges" to their constitutional courts precisely be-
cause they want these bodies to be distinct from and command more re-
spect than the ordinary courts." 4 These priorities are reflected in the formal
rules they maintain for selecting their justices, which differ markedly from
the procedures and qualifications required to seat an ordinary court
judge."5 For example, while in many civil law societies students must first
go through a separate training program to become regular judges before
working their way up through the ordinary court hierarchy, aspirants to
constitutional courts need not possess any special professional qualifica-
tions (as in France)." 6 Alternatively, they may be chosen from a large pool
that often includes ordinary court judges, as well as "full university
professors of law and lawyers with at least twenty years practice" (as in
Italy). "7
That prior judicial experience is not required is reflected in the per-
sons who attain seats on these constitutional courts. As Table 1 shows, the
French Constitutional Council, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, is quite a
diverse body composed of former politicians, academics, private practitio-
ners, and, of course, judges. Likewise, the Italian Constitutional Court con-
tains a high percentage of professors, but also includes a former member of
the government. Even the German Constitutional Court, whose members
"must have all the qualifications necessary to become a judge," is more
diverse than the data reveal. Several of the law professors, for example,
came to the bench with extensive political experience as ministers, parlia-
mentarians, or both.
111. SeeMuRPHY, supranote 1 10, at 137.
112. Id.
113. See Rehnquist, supra note 15.
114. Many civil law nations have ordinary courts as well as constitutional courts. Typically, the
latter are the only bodies that have the power to strike down acts of government incompatible with their
constitutional documents; the "ordinary" courts may only refer constitutional questions to the
constitutional court. Lee Epstein et al., Comparing Judicial Selection Systems, 10 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 7, 13 (2001).
115. Id. at 12-15 (2001).
116. Id. at 17.
117. See Consulta Online, The Constitutional Court (English), at http://www.giurcost.org/
traduzioni/inglese.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2003).
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Table 1 Position at Time of Appointment of Justices Serving on
Three European Constitutional Courts
Position When Appointed Constitutional Court
Germany118 France 119  Italy1
20
Government Attorney 0 1 0
Government Position that Does Not 1 4 1
Require Legal Training
Attorney in Private Practice 1 1 1
Professor 7 2 9
Judge 6 1 4
Total 15 9 15
Currently, certain decision makers in Europe who have developed
explicit structures to instantiate a professional lower judiciary do not seem
to adhere to the norm of prior judicial experience when it comes to ap-
pointments to their highest tribunals. Those in the U.S., on the other hand,
seem determined to follow the norm when it comes to appointments to
their highest Court. Ironically, it is perhaps the case that many U.S.
Supreme Court justices would have been unable to attain appointment to
European constitutional courts because their career experience is simply
too limited. But it does appear that most of the current nine justices would
have little difficulty meeting some of the criteria necessary to sit on lower
European courts, as they have on average served 8.9 years on federal or
state benches before attaining their current positions on the Supreme
Court.' Due to their more varied career experiences, however, the current
Court's predecessors would have found it easier to attain positions on civil
law constitutional courts, but more difficult to gain appointment to the or-
dinary courts. For those justices appointed between 1900 and 1971, the
mean number of prior judicial service is only 4.3 years.'22
In addition to Rehnquist and his concern of resembling civil law
courts, other former justices have been discouraged by the norm of prior
judicial experience. Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote in 1957:
One is entitled to say without qualification, that the correlation
between prior judicial experience and fitness for the functions of
the Supreme Court is zero. The significance of the greatest among
118. See Das Bundesverfassungsgericht, at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/cgi-bin/
link.pl?aktuell (last visited Mar. 17, 2003) (providing data as of 2000).
119. See Conseil Constitutionnel, Constitutional Council: Members (English), at
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/langues/anglais/ang3.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2003) (providing
data as of 2000 via judges' biographies).
120. See http://www.cortecostituzionale.it/eng/lacortecostituzionale/composizione/composizione.asp
(last visited Apr. 14, 2003) (providing data as of 2000 via judges' biographies).
121. This counts Rehnquist's time as an associate justice.
122. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 324-29 tbl.4-9.
[Vol. 91:903
THE NORM OF PRIOR JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE
the Justices who had had such experience, Holmes and Cardozo,
derived not from that judicial experience but from the fact that they
were Holmes and Cardozo.123
Frankfurter's former colleague, Sherman Minton, who had served as a fed-
eral judge prior to his ascension to the Court, apparently agreed. In re-
sponse to Frankfurter's comments, Minton wrote: "'A copy of your
lecture... should be sent to each member of Congress.... I am a living
example that judicial experience ... doesn't make one prescient."" 24
We agree with these general sentiments but for a different reason.
While it may be that a norm of judicial experience will not lead to respect
for the federal bench or to judicial "greatness,"' 125 it seems clear that it will
and, in fact, has led to judicial homogeneity. As we detail in Parts II and III
below, this concept is fraught with dangers. In general terms, because di-
versity is an important condition for the effective performance of our basic
social institutions, a lack of diversity can lead to suboptimal decision mak-
ing. This argument, as we explain in Part II, finds support in numerous
analyses of various institutions, from the most decentralized frameworks
(such as markets) to the most centralized (such as democratic decision-
making bodies). Another danger, which we document in Part III, pertains
specifically to the Supreme Court. Because few women and people of color
hold positions on the federal courts, the limited pool of potential nominees
from federal appellate courts may work to restrict diversity on other di-
mensions, such as gender and race/ethnicity.
II
THE IMPORTANCE OF DIVERSITY IN INSTITUTIONS
Most contemporary support for diversity comes from those who claim
past exclusion from America's legal, political, and economic affairs.2 6
Typically, they ground their claims in arguments about unfair treatment
and previous injustices, and they focus attention on the need to expand par-
ticipation in political and economic life. Although these claims are cast in
the language of diversity, advocates usually place their primary emphasis
on inclusion, and they center their justifications not so much on the
123. Felix Frankfurter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 781, 795
(1957).
124. ABRAHAM, supra note 105, at 61 n.98 (quoting letter from then-retired Justice Sherman
Minton, U.S. Supreme Court, to Justice Felix Frankfurter, U.S. Supreme Court (Apr. 18, 1957) (on file
with Library of Congress, Frankfurter Papers)). In the same year, Justice William 0. Douglas wrote
that "the requirement of prior judicial service is an unwise one and over the years would have too
narrowing an effect." Letter from Justice William 0. Douglas, U.S. Supreme Court, to Fred Rodell,
Professor of Law, Yale Law School (Mar. 2, 1957), available at http://www.haverford.edu/library/
special/aids/rodell/rodellbxl0.jpg (last visited Mar. 17, 2003).
125. For more on this point, see infra note 213.
126. See, e.g., ADOLPH L. REED, JR., WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL (1999); CORNEL WEST, RACE
MATTERS (1993); IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990).
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benefits of diversity, but rather on the rights of groups previously denied
participation and influence. 27
Though we find considerable merit in many of these claims, they do
not form the basis of our support of diversity. 28 Instead, we develop our
own justification and argue that diversity is distinctly related to the effec-
tive performance of social, economic, and political institutions. The Court
is one such institution. In this Part we argue that diversity, on dimensions
such as career experience, can enhance the Court's performance. For our
purposes here, it is helpful to think of the Court as a nine-member deci-
sion-making body whose primary task is to resolve problems arising out of
conflicts over constitutional and other legal questions. There are a number
of ways these nine individuals might go about resolving these conflicts.
The different conceptions would be grounded in different assumptions we
might make about what motivates the justices in their decision making.'29
On one end of the motivational dimension, the justices may be motivated
by a principled pursuit of the law and thus search for the correct answer to
legal questions. On the other end, the justices may be motivated by per-
sonal political goals and preferences and thus strive to achieve a collective
decision that approximates the preferences of as many of the American
people as possible. And, of course, there are a number of other conceptions
somewhere in between these two that would reflect a mixture of assump-
tions about the legal and political motivations affecting the judicial deci-
sion-making process.
Regardless of the particular conception one might endorse, each of
these conceptions shares a similar structure: A group of individuals work
together in pursuit of a collective judgment by sharing their individual
knowledge and abilities and aggregating them as they see best. This basic
structure is also reflected, in varying degrees, by many other social, eco-
nomic, and political institutions. This structure forms the basis of our ar-
gument about the value of diversity in general and about the value of career
diversity on the Court. We proceed as follows: first, we sketch out the ba-
sic argument for why diversity enhances institutional performance; then,
we draw support for the argument by illustrating the role that diversity
plays in the justification of other types of institutions.
A. A General Argument for Diversity
We define social institutions as follows: "Institutions are the humanly
devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are made up of
127. See supra note 126.
128. We do, however, return to these claims in Part 1II, where we discuss the implications of
career diversity for the Court.
129. There is extensive literature on the various motivations ofjudges, which we have discussed in
detail elsewhere. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998).
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formal constraints (e.g., rules, laws, and constitutions), informal constraints
(e.g., norms of behavior, conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct),
and their enforcement characteristics."' 30 Put simply, institutions structure
social life by establishing the incentives and sanctions, the principles and
standards, and the modes of appropriate behavior that define the nature of
social cooperation. But social cooperation takes many forms, and different
institutional arrangements have been developed to satisfy the particular
needs of the various aspects of social life. For example, we observe differ-
ent types of institutional frameworks for economic, political, and legal in-
teractions.
Analysts justify these differences by making claims about the "best"
way to satisfy the particular functions of a given social interaction,' 3 ' with
the claims themselves often associated with basic institutional arrange-
ments. The literature on institutions is full of claims akin to the follow-
ing: "Markets are the most efficient means of allocating economic
resources and distributing economic benefits"; "Democratic decision-
making procedures are the fairest and most equitable means of making
collective decisions and satisfying political interests"; "Common law
adjudication is the best means of arriving at a just and socially beneficial
body of law"; or "Trial by jury is the best means of assessing the guilt or
innocence of criminal defendants." The list continues, but in each instance,
the basic point remains: Institutions are justified by their capacity to out-
perform other types of structures in meeting our basic social needs.
Each institutional form is characterized by some combination of a ba-
sic array of social mechanisms: competition, coordination, deliberation,
bargaining, voting, and so on. In various ways, these mechanisms aggre-
gate individual actions into social outcomes. The combinations vary across
institutional forms. For example, markets encourage competition, while
democratic bodies encourage deliberation and voting. But what is striking
about the justifications of the different combinations is that they share a
basic logic about the effective performance of social institutions-a logic
that rests on the belief that groups can, under the appropriate conditions,
make better decisions than individuals. The phrase "under the appropriate
conditions" is important here because arguments regarding the appropri-
ateness of particular institutions usually relate to the appropriate institu-
tional conditions for certain types of social interactions. For example,
claims about market superiority are grounded in claims about the appropri-
ateness of decentralized exchange for effective economic activity.
130. Douglass North, Economic Performance over Time, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN
SOCIOLOGY 248 (Mary C. Brinton & Victor Nee eds., 1998).
131. See Jack Knight, A Pragmatist Approach to the Proper Scope of Government, 157 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 28 (2001).
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Regardless of the particulars, however, the standard justifications of
our basic legal, political, and economic institutions are based on the idea
that better decisions follow from a process by which individuals contribute
their individual knowledge to the collective activity. By so doing, indi-
viduals test the merits of their own ideas and beliefs, as well as the ideas
and beliefs of others. This process produces a collective understanding that
is superior to one held by an individual. With this superior knowledge
base, better solutions to collective problems emerge.
Accordingly, the effectiveness of institutional performance depends
fundamentally on two features: (1) the diversity of inputs, and (2) an effec-
tive process of experimentation, inquiry, and testing. On the one hand, the
diversity of inputs broadens and enhances the base upon which experimen-
tation, inquiry, and testing occurs. Here the diversity-of-inputs requirement
favors diversity of participation; the greater the diversity of participation by
people of different backgrounds and experiences, the greater the range of
ideas and information contributed to the institutional process. On the other
hand, this institutional process tests ideas and information in terms of their
quality alone. The condition of effective experimentation, inquiry, and test-
ing thus entails procedural constraints on extraneous factors that would
distort the testing of information and ideas. For example, any characteris-
tics of an individual unrelated to the quality of his or her ideas and beliefs
would be constrained from consideration in the testing process. Therefore,
the overall effectiveness of these institutional mechanisms is a function of
our ability to satisfy the requirements of diversity and effective experimen-
tation, inquiry, and testing.
Thus, our argument for the value of diversity on the Court follows
from the justification of our basic social institutions: Given the appropriate
procedural conditions, our institutions are most effective when participa-
tion is most diverse.
Having presented the central argument, we now support it with refer-
ence to basic institutional theories. We start with centralized institutions-
collective decision-making bodies-and then move to more decentralized
institutions-the market and the common law. As we show, although these
different institutional forms vary markedly in terms of the appropriate con-
ditions of organization (e.g., decentralized market for economic exchange,
but centralized deliberation and voting for democratic decision making),
they share the same basic logic of diversity in their underlying institutional
processes.
1. Diversity in Collective Decision-Making Bodies
The idea that groups make better decisions than individuals is a stan-
dard feature of many justifications of democracy and other collective
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decision-making procedures. 132 One of the primary sources of this justifica-
tion has been the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 3 which asserts that a group of
individuals, using a majority-rule voting procedure, will produce a collec-
tive decision that is more accurate than the decision of any individual
member of the group.'34 The main theorem assumes: (1) the question is a
binary decision problem, (2) the participants each have greater than a 50%
likelihood that they know the correct answer to the question, and (3) the
individual participants' votes are statistically independent.3 5 From these
conditions Condorcet deduced two main conclusions that have important
consequences for the use of majority-rule voting. First, a majority of the
group of voters will more often produce the correct decision than will any
of the individual members of the group. Second, as the size of the group
increases, the probability that the group will be correct approaches
100%.136
The Condorcet Jury Theorem and its underlying intuition about the
epistemological value of group decision making has formed the basis for
many defenses of the value of collective decision-making mechanisms.
Bernard Grofman and Scott Feld'37 and David Estlund,"' among others,
ground their support of majority-rule mechanisms on the epistemic advan-
tages of aggregating individually held ideas and information. James
Bohman 139 and Jack Knight and James Johnson 4° offer similar arguments
about the superiority of shared knowledge as justification for deliberative
132. See David M. Estlund et al., Democratic Theory and the Public Interest: Condorcet and
Rousseau Revisited, AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1317, 1322 (1989); Bernard Grofman & Scott L. Feld,
Rousseau's General Will: A Condorcetian Perspective, 82 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 567, 572 (1988).
133. See Marquis de Condorcet, Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Theory of
Decision-Making, in CONDORCET: SELECTED WRITINGS 33 (Keith Michael Baker ed., 1976). Note that
we focus here exclusively on the Condorcet Jury Theorem as the source of the claim that collective
decision-making procedures benefit from diversity. We do so because the epistemic argument
supported by the theory mirrors the justifications for other institutional forms discussed below. There
are, however, other arguments that we could have offered to support the benefits of diversity for
democratic institutions. Consider, for example, Madison's argument in Federalist No. 10, that diversity
was necessary for the stability of the American state and for the preservation of liberty. THE
FEDERALIST No. I o (James Madison).
134. An "accurate" decision entails one that resolves whether a statement of fact is true or false.
Id.
135. Condorcet, supra note 133, at 33-45.
136. Id. at 50-70.
137. See generally Grofman & Feld, supra note 132.
138. See Estlund et al., supra note 132.
139. James Bohman, Deliberative Democracy and Effective Social Freedom: Capabilities,
Resources and Opportunities, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS 321
(James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997) [hereinafter DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY].
140. Jack Knight & James Johnson, What Sort of Equality Does Deliberative Democracy
Require?, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 139, at 279.
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mechanisms; Lewis Komhauser and Lawrence Sager 4' offer an equivalent
claim in their analysis of collegial courts. Finally, Nicholas Miller'42 and
Krishna Ladha and Gary Miller'43 explicitly employ the epistemic argu-
ment to emphasize the importance of diversity for democratic political in-
stitutions. All of these analyses rest on the idea that centralized collective
decision-making procedures are substantially enhanced by the diversity of
ideas guaranteed by the free and equal participation of all members of the
relevant group.
Much of the recent work on the Condorcet Jury Theorem has focused
on Condorcet's assumptions, arguing that the narrowness of his assump-
tions undennines the importance of his conclusions. Recent research has
modified these assumptions and assessed whether the claims about the
value of diversity for collective decision making can be sustained. The re-
sults have been mixed. Some analysts find that they can loosen the assump-
tions and still maintain the basic claim about the epistemic superiority of
majority rule. For example, Grofman, Guillermo Owen, and Feld'44 dem-
onstrate that we can relax the assumption about the homogeneity of the
individual probabilities of correctness, allowing for the possibility that the
individual members of the group differ in these probabilities, and maintain
the basic conclusions of the theorem. Similarly, Ladha shows that relaxing
the assumption about the statistical independence of the individual votes
does not impinge on the claim about the benefits of majority rule.'45 On the
other hand, recent analyses that focus on the crucial assumption that indi-
viduals vote sincerely-that they base their individual votes on what they
think is the correct answer without reference to the final decisions of oth-
ers-have reached a different conclusion. When they analyzed the Condor-
cet decision-making problem under the assumption that the participants
vote in a sophisticated manner, David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks'46
141. Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82 (1986)
(basing their arguments around a "collegial court," which they use to refer to any multimember judicial
body).
142. Nicholas R. Miller, Information, Electorates, and Democracy: Some Extensions and
Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, in INFORMATION POOLING AND GROUP DECISION
MAKING 173 (Bernard Grofman & Guillermo Owen eds., 1986); Nicholas R. Miller, Pluralism and
Social Choice, 77 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 734 (1983).
143. Krishna K. Ladha & Gary Miller, Political Discourse, Factions, and the General
Will: Correlated Voting and Condorcet's Jury Theorem, in COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING: SOCIAL
CHOICE AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 393 (Norman Schofield ed., 1996).
144. Bernard Grofman et al., Thirteen Theorems in Search of the Truth, 15 THEORY & DECISION
261 (1983). '
145. Krishna K. Ladha, Information Pooling Through Majority-Rule Voting: Condorcet's Jury
Theorem with Correlated Votes, 26 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 353 (1995); Krishna K. Ladha, The
Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated Votes, 36 AM. J. POL. Scl. 617 (1992).
146. David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the
Condorcet Jury Theorem, 90 AM. POL. SCl. REV. 34 (1996).
[Vol. 91:903
THE NORM OF PRIOR JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE
and Timothy Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer'47 discovered that there
are conditions under which Condorcet's conclusion about the epistemic
superiority of majority rule do not hold.
Thus, it is unclear how far one would want to extend the Condorcet
Jury Theorem as the basis for a broad epistemic claim about majority rule.
The challenge to the sincere voting assumption highlights a more general
issue about the relevance of the Condorcet result for a justification of col-
lective decision-making procedures. As we stated, the theorem analyzes the
resolution of questions of fact. This is clearly relevant to the deliberations
of juries and to some of the issues on the agenda of collegial courts. But
many, if not most, of the decisions faced by collective decision-making
bodies are not questions of fact but, rather, issues of preference aggrega-
tion. In other words, these decisions are not about what people think is cor-
rect but, rather, about what people prefer. The relevance of the Condorcet
Jury Theorem for a more general justification of collective decision-
making mechanisms would seem to rest on the importance of information
and knowledge aggregation toward these latter processes.
Advocates for the continued relevance of the theorem offer two pri-
mary arguments in support of their position. First, they assert that the re-
cent criticisms of the theorem are only relevant if we actually believe that
individuals act in a sophisticated way about questions of fact. Hence, we
need to believe that individuals have a stronger preference for causally af-
fecting the outcome than they do for helping the group arrive at the correct
answer. Margolis offers a set of compelling arguments suggesting that this
is not a well-founded belief in most normal social situations. 148 Second,
advocates argue that the broader relevance of the theorem is contingent on
the relative importance of deliberation for democratic decision-making
bodies. If we limit democratic decision making merely to preference ag-
gregation, then the Condorcet Jury Theorem may have little relevance.
However, if we allow a substantial role for information sharing and knowl-
edge acquisition in democratic processes, the idea that collective decision-
making bodies are substantially enhanced by the diversity of ideas guaran-
teed by the free and equal participation of all members of the relevant
group continues to be relevant.
147. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of
Unanimous Jury Verdicts Under Strategic Voting, 92 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 23 (1998).
148. Howard Margolis, Pivotal Voting and the Emperor's New Clothes, 19 Soc. CHOICE &
WELFARE 95 (2002) (noting that the argument that pivotal voting is a necessary feature of any system
of jury decision making is not well supported); Howard Margolis, Game Theory and Juries: A
Miraculous Result, 13 J. THEORETICAL POL. 425 (2001) (noting that the recent theoretic criticisms of
the Condorcet Jury Theorem make assumptions about the motivations of individual jurors that cannot
be reasonably justified); Howard Margolis, Pivotal Voting, 13 J. THEORETICAL POL. 111 (2001) (noting
that the assumption that individual jurors care more about being decisive than being correct is
necessary for the argument that the theory of pivotal voting is relevant to the Condorcet Jury Theorem).
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2. The Importance of Diversity in the Argument for Competitive Markets
Diversity has also played an important, somewhat implicit, role in the
justification of economic institutions. Although competitive markets share
few, if any, institutional features with centralized collective decision-
making bodies, they do share the underlying logic that effective institu-
tional performance depends on finding a way to institutionalize the benefits
of diversity. As with collective decision making, claims of the superiority
of competitive markets for economic activity rest on the ways in which
decentralized mechanisms effectively test the relative value of diverse al-
ternatives. Consider, for example, Friedrich Hayek's description of the
value of free market. He notes that the original justification for the market
was based on the idea that it is composed of a set of institutions designed to
produce collectively beneficial outcomes through the contributions of self-
interested individuals:
The chief concern of the great individualist writers was indeed to
find a set of institutions by which man could be induced, by his
own choice and from the motives which determined his ordinary
conduct, to contribute as much as possible to the need of all others;
and their discovery was that the system of private property did
provide such inducements to a much greater extent than had yet
been understood.149
Through the salutary effects of competition, the market produces benefits,
the most important involving the ways in which competition solves prob-
lems of information acquisition and the effective use of knowledge. 5 '
Hayek argues that for society, the most significant problem related to
economic activity is "one of rapid adaptation to changes in the particular
circumstances of time and place. ,,1." To adequately solve this problem,
Hayek states:
[T]he ultimate decisions must be left to the people who are familiar
with these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant
changes and of the resources immediately available to meet
them.... We need decentralization because only thus can we
insure that the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time
and place will be promptly used.'52
Hayek's argument here rests on the ways in which decentralized decision
making aggregates information. On his account, the market allows each
149. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 12-13 (1948).
150. Friedrich A. Hayek, Competition as a Discovery Procedure, in THE ESSENCE OF HAYEK 254,
255 (Chiaki Nishiyama & Kurt R. Leube eds., 1984) ("[C]ompetition as a procedure for the discovery
of such facts as, without resort to it, would not be known to anyone, or at least would not be
utilised.... competition is valuable only because, and so far as, its results are unpredictable and on the
whole different from those which anyone has, or could have, deliberately aimed at.").
151. HAYEK, supra note 149, at 83.
152. Id. at 83-84.
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individual to contribute his or her own local knowledge to a social process
that effectively aggregates the knowledge in the pursuit of collectively
beneficial outcomes. 153
Hayek emphasizes that the effectiveness of competition is contingent
on the equal participation by diverse members of the society. The impor-
tance of the diversity of participation follows directly from the uncertainty
produced by the complexity of economic activity. The basic problem "is
that nobody can know who knows best and that the only way by which we
can find out is through a social process in which everybody is allowed to
try and see what he can do.' 54 Moreover, the participation must be free
and voluntary. 
155
From these principles, Hayek concludes that the establishment of an
institutional framework for experimentation and testing are preconditions
for achieving the positive value of diversity of participation. He attributes
this view to the earliest advocates of the market:
They were more than merely aware of the conflicts of individual
interests and stressed the necessity of 'well-constructed
institutions' where the 'rules and principles of contending interests
and compromised advantages' would reconcile conflicting interests
without giving any one group power to make their views and
interests always prevail over those of all others.156
Hayek associates the distortions of market competition with misuses of
power, either by government or economic actors:
All we need to consider is how difficult it is in a competitive
system to discover ways of supplying to consumers better or
cheaper goods than they already get. Where such unused
opportunities seem to exist we usually find that they remain
undeveloped because their use is either prevented by the power of
authority (including the enforcement of patent privileges), or by
some private misuse of power which the law ought to prohibit.157
For Hayek, this places government in the rather paradoxical position of
using coercive power as a way of limiting coercive power in the market. 58
Here the importance of diversity of participation, achieved through
effective experimentation, inquiry, and testing, is clearly articulated as a
153. Id.
154. Id. at 15.
155. Id. at 16 ("From the awareness of the limitations of individual knowledge and from the fact
that no person or small group of persons can know all that is known to somebody, individualism also
derives its main practical conclusion: its demand for a strict limitation of-all coercive or exclusive
power.").
156. Id. at 13 (citation omitted).
157. Hayek, supra note 150, at 260.
158. HAYEK, supra note 149, at 16-17 ("True individualism.., does not deny the necessity of
coercive power but wishes to limit it-to limit it to those fields where it is indispensable to prevent
coercion by others and in order to reduce the total of coercion to a minimum.").
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necessary condition for the effective performance of markets. On Hayek's
account, individual decision makers lack the knowledge and capacity to
make broad economic decisions affecting the society as a whole. Societies
need institutional mechanisms to aggregate, through a process of
experimentation and testing, individual contributions of knowledge and
resources. Since each of us lacks the knowledge to know who knows best
in a particular situation, we have to organize ourselves to effectively garner
the benefits from the diversity of economic ideas and experiences.
3. Diversity as a Justification for Common Law Courts
The relevance of diversity for the effective competition of ideas also
can be found in justifications of common law adjudication. Common law
adjudication involves two related competitive processes: the structured
competition that takes place within formal judicial institutions, and the un-
structured competition through which social norms and principles, em-
ployed by judges in their decision making, evolve over time.
Consider Richard Posner's pragmatic justification for the value of the
common law.'59 Posner begins by acknowledging that because judges will
more likely confront legal questions that lack a clear and straightforward
answer in the common law,"60 as opposed to statutory and even constitu-
tional law, common law decision making introduces important questions of
objectivity and legitimacy. Posner is troubled by the "inherently precari-
ous" position of judges in a democratic polity.16 Fairness, insofar as it is
attainable, requires that jurists insulate themselves from powerful outside
influences. Such independence, however, comes at the price of distancing
the judiciary from sources of moral and political legitimacy. In other
words, while an independent judiciary makes decisions with far-reaching
social and political consequences, it lacks "the intrinsic authority of the
more 'organic' (popular, authentically sovereign) branches of govern-
ment .. ."162 This is why concerns about the objectivity and legitimacy of
the common law emerge.
For two reasons especially relevant to this discussion of judicial deci-
sion making, Posner recommends legal pragmatism for resolving these is-
sues. First, he asserts that pragmatism will generate much-needed
knowledge about the relationship between law and its consequences. This
knowledge can reduce the indeterminacy in the law and enhance, in an
159. For further elaboration of this argument, see Jack Knight & James Johnson, The Political
Consequences of Pragmatism, 24 POL. THEORY 68 (1996).
160. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 247 (1990) (defining the common
law as "any body of law created primarily by judges through their decisions rather than by the framers
of statutes or constitutions").
161. ld. at 6-7.
162. Id. at 454.
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admittedly weak sense, its objectivity.163 Second, Posner argues that be-
cause pragmatism is oriented to the pursuit of socially desirable conse-
quences, those consequences, if attained, will enhance the legitimacy of
judicial decisions."6 According to Posner, pragmatism has two central fea-
tures that produce these benefits: It is committed to methods of scientific
inquiry, and it relies on social consensus both as a way of deciding cases
and as a source of legitimacy for judicial decisions.
To see the force of Posner's argument, consider what a pragmatist
judge should do in cases that lack a clear and straightforward answer. On
Posner's account, a pragmatist judge should treat the law instrumentally.
She should be forward looking, and her decisions should be based on what
she considers to be the best consequences that a ruling can produce. A
pragmatist judge thus needs to determine: (1) the consequences she should
seek to fulfill in a given case, and (2) the best means of achieving those
consequences. The objectivity and legitimacy of judicial decision making
rest on the way she answers these practical questions.
Posner argues that a pragmatist judge can decide difficult common
law cases without resorting to merely subjective and illegitimate solu-
tions. 65 He answers both the question of what consequences the judge
should seek to effectuate and the question of what means the judge should
employ in so doing by referring to those consequences and reasons that
have survived in an open and unforced competition of ideas.166 He defends
both the objectivity and the legitimacy of pragmatist judicial decisions by
making claims about the nature of that competition, and the conditions un-
der which certain ideas reach a consensus. On his account, pragmatist
judges will be constrained by (or at least show special deference to) princi-
ples and rules that reflect social consensus.'67
Posner's justification of common law adjudication is based on the
quality of the reasons on which judges base their decisions. The argument
is that common law judges will produce socially beneficial decisions when
their decisions are grounded in good reasons. For Posner, there are two
primary categories of good reasons: judicial precedent and principles on
which there is a social consensus. The claims about the socially beneficial
quality of the reasons rest on claims about the processes by which such
reasons are produced. For judicial precedent, the process is the formal in-
stitutional structure instantiated in the decentralized network of courts in
the common law system. For consensus principles, the process is an
163. Id. at 110, 298, 468 (lamenting repeatedly how little is known about the consequences of
judicial decision making).
164. Id. at 112-26.
165. ld. at255.
166. Id. at 112-22.
167. Id at 126.
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unstructured one of informal social interactions from which social norms
and other socially shared ideas emerge.
On this account, Posner characterizes both of these processes by the
existence of "free" or "unforced" inquiry that can generate rules and
knowledge that people accept and continue to reaffirm in uncoerced
ways. '6 This process is analogous to the concept of the marketplace of
ideas, which Posner borrows from Oliver Wendell Holmes' dissenting
opinion in Abrams v. United States.'69 Holmes wrote:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the
very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good
desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market.'7
For the pragmatist, consensus or convergence on a particular principle is
evidence that the principle has demonstrated its value by virtue of having
withstood the "test of time."'' On Posner's account, principles that demon-
strate their utility over time in the face of competing principles enjoy some
presumption as to their socially desirable character.'72
The important feature of this argument is the role that evidence of
consensus and convergence in the evolution of the common law might play
in a pragmatist justification of societal principles and judicial precedent.
The key to this kind of justification is not so much that judges decided pre-
vious cases in a particular way, but rather that the judges deemed the con-
sequences of those decisions sufficiently desirable to replicate and expand
them over time. Posner argues that precedents that meet this standard ac-
quire a more authoritative status over time:
One thing that can solidify a precedent-that can make it
authoritative (or more authoritative) rather than just a source of
information-is its endorsement by many judges over a substantial
period of time. Other things being equal, a conclusion to which a
number of different individuals have come-a conclusion (better, a
hypothesis) that has survived continual retesting-is entitled to
more deference than the conclusion of a single individual. So time
can help stabilize legal doctrine. Notice that, from this perspective,
the more diverse the judiciary, the more its rulings invite unforced
agreement, ungrudging deference.7 3
168. Id.at114.
169. 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 630.
171. POSNER, supra note 160, at 112-22.
172. Id. at 126.
173. Id. at 117-18.
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Thus, the source of legal soundness, according to Posner, rests on the
survival of certain precedents in the competition of the judicial decision-
making process. On Posner's account, the underlying justification of com-
mon law adjudication is that it establishes a competition of ideas that tests
the merits of judicial decisions over time. Through the testing process legal
problems are resolved in a socially beneficial way. And here, by framing
his justification in these terms, Posner highlights another significant effect
of diversity: Not only is diversity important for the generation of inputs,
but it also enhances the subsequent testing of these ideas. As he empha-
sizes, the greater the diversity of participation in the process of experimen-
tation, the more rigorous the test of the value of any particular idea. As
with the market, the justification of the common law system rests in the
end on claims about the conditions under which common law adjudication
takes place and about the effective testing of a diverse set of ideas by a di-
verse judiciary.
III
THE IMPORTANCE OF CAREER DIVERSITY ON THE SUPREME COURT
Thus far we have emphasized the importance of diversity in a range of
institutions. On our account, diversity and the related conditions of effec-
tive experimentation, inquiry, and testing are fundamental to arguments
about the beneficial role institutional mechanisms play in satisfying the
basic needs of society. Establishing the circumstances under which the
conditions are satisfied is a necessary precondition for the effective opera-
tion of the relevant institution. If these conditions are not satisfied, claims
of the superiority of a particular institutional mechanism are undermined.
Our argument for the value of diversity, then, follows from the justification
for the most basic of social institutions: Given the appropriate procedural
conditions, our institutions are most effective when participation is most
diverse.
At the same time, though, we recognize that not all dimensions of di-
versity are of equal importance, at least not when it comes to the selection
of U.S. Supreme Court justices. For obvious reasons, we would not, for
example, advocate the appointment of justices who differ on the dimension
of, say, hair color.
In this Part we argue that career diversity does not fall into the cate-
gory of trivial attributes. Instead, we find quite the opposite. Diversifying
the Court in terms of the career paths taken by its justices would serve two
distinct and important functions. First, operating under the assumption that
diverse groups perform their tasks more ably than homogeneous ones, a
Court composed of justices with different career backgrounds will make
better choices than one replete with, say, U.S. court of appeals judges. Sec-
ond, believing that diversity on other dimensions, especially gender and
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race/ethnicity, is valuable in any number of ways, presidents will have
deeper pools from which to draw potential nominees if they move away
from the norm of prior judicial experience.
A. The Positive Effects of Career Diversity on Judicial Decision Making
Over the past five decades or so, social scientists and legal academics
have produced countless papers examining the personal attributes and
backgrounds of the nation's jurists.'74 Some are largely descriptive efforts,
providing quantitative and qualitative profiles of the judges; 75 but others
are more analytical, seeking to determine the extent to which various at-
tributes and background factors affect the choices jurists make.'76 For ex-
ample, in his classic 1981 study of the personal attributes of U.S. Supreme
Court justices, C. Neal Tate investigated the effect of various background
characteristics (including prosecutorial experience, age, and party affilia-
tion) on judicial votes.'7 7 Writing twenty years later, Deborah Merritt and
James Brudney designed a study to assess whether U.S. court of appeals
judges with experience representing management are more (or less) likely
than colleagues without such experience to publish their opinions in
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") cases."'
To be sure, many studies like those of Tate and Merritt and Brudney
have their share of conceptual and analytical problems. Nonetheless, we
should not ignore the common finding that a link exists between career
diversity and judicial decisions. Specifically, as we depict in the Appendix,
of the twenty-two studies located that investigate this linkage, nearly 70%
found some sort of a relationship between career experience and judicial
choices.
In some instances, career experience turned out to be one of only a
handful of factors that explained the phenomenon under investigation.
Such was the case in the Merritt and Brudney study, in which the research-
ers considered numerous background characteristics of the judges, includ-
ing the party of the appointing president, gender, the law school attended,
experience representing management, and experience in a union, govern-
ment, or academia.'79 Only a few of these variables, including the variable
designed to measure career experiences, were significant predictors of
whether judges published their opinions. The authors reported that appel-
late court panels composed of more judges with experience representing
174. See infra Appendix (providing summaries of several recent, influential studies).
175. See supra note 96; Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 82.
176. See infra Appendix (providing examples).
177. See generally C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of US.
Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 355 (1981).
178. See generally Merritt & Brudney, supra note 61.
179. Id.
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management clients in union cases "were significantly less likely to
publish their opinions than were other panels." 8' Experience and expertise,
Merritt and Brudney argued, accounted for this rather counterintuitive re-
sult: Judges who formerly represented management
have more experience implementing the NLRA than judges lacking
a management background. Applying the same circuit rules and
guidelines as colleagues who are less versed in labor law, they may
genuinely view a higher percentage of cases as routine and
unworthy of publication. The negative association between
publication and number of panel members with NLRA
management experience, in sum, most likely stems from
[differences in] expertise rather than strategic conduct. 181
Given the goal of the Merritt and Brudney study to explain the publi-
cation choices of judges in labor cases, their concern with legal experience
is sensible. But as the Appendix shows, their approach is only one of many
possible approaches to capturing the effect of career experience. For exam-
ple, in his analysis of the methods used by judges to interpret the tax code,
Daniel Schneider was interested in the primary work experience of the ju-
rists under investigation-whether that experience came in private practice,
in government, as a judge, or as a professor. 182 Tate took into account
whether a justice with prosecutorial experience also had judicial experi-
ence, "'83 finding that while prosecutors are less favorable to rights and liber-
ties claims, those with some judicial experience are more favorable than
those without it, "reflecting the moderating influence of sitting on the other
side of the bench."' 84 Gregory Sisk and his colleagues, in their quest to ex-
plain decisions involving the federal sentencing guidelines, even consid-
ered whether jurists had any military experience. 185
As the Appendix shows, the type of judicial decision making under
investigation also varied. In many instances, the researcher was concerned
solely with explaining the votes of judges. Brudney and his colleagues'
exploration of labor cases serves as an example. The authors used several
background variables, such as experience as a law professor and as an
elected office holder, to predict whether judges would vote for or against
the outcome desired by a labor union. 86 In other studies, the concern was
less with the vote and more with other types of judicial choices, such as
adherence to precedent or the tendency to dissent.'87 Some even sought to
180. Id. at 95-96.
181. Id. at 102-03 (citation omitted).
182. Schneider, supra note 61, at 335.
183. Tate, supra note 177, at 362.
184. Id.
185. Sisk et al., supra note 61, at 1478-79.
186. Brudney et al., supra note 61, at 1699-1704.
187. Schmidhauser, supra note 61; Goldman, supra note 61.
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explore the reasoning jurists used in their opinions. Schneider's essay
serves as an example, as does the Sisk study, which invoked occupational
variables not only to explain whether judges upheld or struck down the
sentencing guidelines but also to examine the reasoning jurists employed in
their decisions. 188
Despite these variations, the near uniformity of the results is over-
whelming. Whether the authors approached career path in specific ways
(e.g., legal experience representing management) or more general ones
(e.g., any experience in private practice) or whether they sought to account
for the vote, legal reasoning, or some other feature of judicial decision
making, they generally found that career experience influenced judicial
decision making. In several instances, the results took even the authors by
surprise. Consider the conclusion reached by Sisk and his colleagues:
Our findings provide greater support to the behavioral model of
judicial decision making than we anticipated. While most of the
social background variables we explored proved insignificant,
some striking findings emerged that were consistent with a
sociological or social construction model of decision making,
particularly with respect to the prior employment variable. For
example, prior experience as a criminal defense lawyer was
significant under several formulations of our dependent variables
as an explanatory variable for opposition to the Sentencing
Guidelines. On the other hand, prior experience as a state or local
judge was related to upholding the Guidelines as constitutionally
valid. 9
We believe that such results, along with the many others depicted in
the Appendix, underscore the importance of career diversity on collegial
courts. Because judges with varied career experiences bring distinct per-
spectives to the bench-perspectives that ultimately lead them to make
distinct judicial choices-merging jurists with diverse career paths on a
particular Court ought (in accord with our analysis in Part II) lead to more
effective decision making.
B. Eliminating Career Homogeneity to Diversify the Gender and
Racial/Ethnic Composition of the Court
As the quote above from the Sisk study suggests, not all background
characteristics are as helpful in explaining variation in judicial choices as
career experiences. Many characteristics, in fact, generate far more am-
biguous results. Gender is a good example. For virtually every study that
188. Schneider, supra note 61; Sisk et al., supra note 61.
189. Sisk et al., supra note 61, at 1383 (citations omitted).
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has found that female judges behave differently than their male counter-
parts, there is a study that has found no differences between the two.' 90
Simply because relationships between judicial choice and gender are
more ambiguous than relationships between judicial choice and career path
does not reduce the importance of gender diversity. We need not recount
here why variation in gender and race/ethnicity is desirable; scores of
scholars, commentators, and policymakers have already done so.9 What is
worthy of emphasis is that decision makers ought be attentive to career
path when making nominations to the Court because increasing diversity
on this dimension may lead to increases in diversity on other critical di-
mensions, but particularly gender and race/ethnicity.
To see why, consider Table 2, which shows the numbers of women,
Blacks, Latinas/os; and Asian Americans holding positions that, at least
before the onset of the norm of prior federal judicial experience, presidents
and Senates regarded as appropriate springboards to the Court. Note first
that if decision makers continue to follow the norm and appoint only cur-
rent U.S. court of appeals judges, the numbers of women and people of
color available for appointment are quite limited. Of those jurists in active
service, only thirty-five are women and just twenty-three are racial/ethnic
minorities. Those numbers begin to border on the trivial if we consider that
presidents typically nominate members of their own political party to the
Court (and to the lower federal courts).' Since only eleven of the women
and two of the minorities on the U.S. courts of appeals are Republicans, if
George W. Bush followed both the norms of experience and of partisan-
ship, he would be forced to draw from a very small pool of candidates
comprising mostly Whites and males.
190. There are many relatively recent reviews of this literature. See Schneider, supra note 61, at
350 ("Studies about the impact of gender on judges' decisions are divided in their conclusions, some
perceiving a difference and others, not."); see also Lee Epstein & Lynn Mather, Beverly Blair
Cook: The Value of Eclecticism, in THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (Nancy Maveety ed., 2002);
Michael E. Solimine & Susan E. Wheatley, Rethinking Feminist Judging, 70 IND. L.J. 891 (1995).
191. See generally DEREK BOK & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM
CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1998).
192. Of Clinton's sixty-one appointees to the U.S. courts of appeals, 85.2% were Democrats. The
percentages of Republicans appointed by Reagan and Bush Sr. were higher (96.2% and 89.2%,
respectively). See Goldman & Slotnick, supra note 82, at 249.
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Table 2 Potential Pools of Candidates for U.S. Supreme Court Seats,
by Gender and Race/Ethnicity
U.S. Courts State Tenured Members of Members Governors Partners
of Appeals Supreme Law School Pro- the U.S. of State in Law
Judges' 93  Court fessors (Includ- Congress 196 Legislatures Firms 197
Justices 194 ing Deans) 19 5
Women 35 66 999 73198 1,668199 5200 7,669201
Blacks 12 25 230 37202 583203 0204 Not available
Latinas/os 10 4 114 22205 198206 0207 Not available
Asian Americans 1 6 62 6 72208 2209 Not available
Total Minority 23 35 406 61 853 2 1,723211
As the table shows, altering the norm of prior federal judicial experi-
ence just slightly to include service on a state supreme court would work to
increase the available pool of female candidates and those of color. Only
Latinas/os have less representation on the nation's highest state courts than
they do on the federal courts of appeals; women, in contrast, hold nearly
double the number of seats on the state courts than on the U.S. courts of
appeals. Even so, the numbers remain relatively small in comparison to
193. Id. at 250 (including data only of judges in active service).
194. John B. Wefing, State Supreme Court Justices: Who Are They?, 32 NEw ENG. L. REv. 47,
52 (1997) (data are for 1996).
195. Ass'n of Am. Law Schools, Statistical Report on Law School Faculty and Candidates for
Law Faculty Positions 2000-2001, at http://www.aals.org/statistics/index.html#women (last visited
Mar. 17, 2003) (data are for 1999-2000).
196. Data are for the 108th Congress. See infra notes 198, 202.
197. Nat'l Ass'n for Law Placement Found., Women and Attorneys of Color at Law Firms - 1999,
at http://www.nalp.org/nalpresearch/mw99sum.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2003) (data are for 1999).
198. Ctr. for Am. Women & Politics, Women Who Will Serve in the 108th Congress 2003-05, at
http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/facts/cong-03.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2003).
199. Ctr. for Am. Women & Politics, Women in Elected Office 2003: Fact Sheet Summaries, at
http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/-cawp/facts/cawpfs.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2003) (data are for 2002) (on
file with authors).
200. Id.
201. See Nat'l Ass'n for Law Placement Found., supra note 197.
202. CBSNews.com, Meet the New Congress, at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/0/06/
politics/main535476.shtml (Jan. 6, 2003).
203. Ctr. for Voting & Democracy, Racial Representation in State Legislatures 2000, at
http://www.fairvote.org/vra/legrace.htm (last modified Feb. 26, 2003) (data are for 2000).
204. Ctr. for Voting & Democracy, Party Affiliation and Race of Governors by State 2001, at
http://www.fairvote.org/vra/govrace.htm (last modified Feb. 26, 2003) (data are for 2001).
205. See supra note 202.
206. See Ctr. for Voting & Democracy, supra note 203 (data are for 2000).
207. See Ctr. for Voting & Democracy, supra note 204 (data are for 2001).
208. See Ctr. for Voting & Democracy, supra note 203 (data are for 2000).
209. See Ctr. for Voting & Democracy, supra note 204 (data are for 2001).
210. See Nat'l Ass'n for Law Placement Found., supra note 197 (including African Americans,
Asian/Pacific Islanders, American Indians, and Latinas/os).
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those that would be obtained if the president looked toward the nation's
law schools-either to deans or other tenured professors.
Over the past decade or so the number of female professors has in-
creased dramatically, such that there are now nearly a thousand in the sen-
ior ranks of legal academia. The figures for minorities are not as large, but
they are certainly greater than those for state and federal judges. Of course,
we are not suggesting that every female law professor or state supreme
court justice is qualified to serve on the Court, just as not every member of
the lower federal appellate bench would pass scrutiny either. But surely
lurking in the nation's law schools are many Felix Frankfurters and Harlan
Fiske Stones-distinguished justices who came to the Court directly from
academia, or spent large portions of their career there.
Additionally, the nation's legislatures must house promising candi-
dates as well. Though complaints about the underrepresentation of women,
Blacks, Latinas/os, and Asian Americans in the U.S. Congress remain
valid, the numbers of women and minorities are larger there than in the
U.S. courts of appeals. Women now hold fourteen seats in the U.S. Senate
and fifty-nine in the House,2"' with 35.6%, or twenty-six seats, filled by
female Republicans. Again, the figures are smaller for Blacks, Latinas/os,
and Asian Americans, but in all three cases they are greater than they are
for positions on the U.S. courts of appeals.
Searching at the state level for potential candidates would have an
even greater impact. For years social scientists have observed that state
legislatures provide large openings for minorities and, especially, women
to make their way into politics. Sandra Day O'Connor provides an exam-
ple, and the data show that she is not alone. In 2002, 1,668 women served
in the nation's state legislatures-a figure larger than their presence on
U.S. courts of appeals, on state supreme courts, in law schools, and in
Congress combined. They also serve as the governors in five states, as well
as lieutenant governors in seventeen others. Blacks, Latinas/os, and Asian
Americans do not yet have as strong a presence as state governors, but they
are becoming increasingly represented in state legislatures.
Of course, not all legislators and executives, just as not all law profes-
sors or U.S. court of appeals judges, are qualified to serve on the nation's
highest court. At least some nontrivial percentage do not even hold law
degrees, a seemingly ironclad (though not constitutionally mandated) re-
quirement for nomination."' But this criterion is certainly not a problem
for partners in private practice law firms. As indicated by Table 2, large
numbers of women and minorities hold these positions. While the percent-
ages of women and minorities serving as partners remain relatively low,
the absolute numbers are large compared to the other categories we have
211. See Ctr. for Am. Women & Politics, supra note 198.
212. ABRAHAM, supra note 3, at 35.
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examined. Thus, private firms may be presidents' greatest untapped source
(at least in contemporary times) for potential nominees.
IV
IMPLICATION OF THE STUDY
As is true for many academics, we sometimes struggle to develop the
policy implications of our research. But that is not the case here. In fact, we
believe our work leads to a conclusion as stark as the data we have pre-
sented throughout-namely, that both the president and Senate ought strive
to create a more diverse Court by taking into account the career experi-
ences of potential nominees, just as they are now attentive to other dimen-
sions of diversity (such as race and gender) when they make appointments
to the bench.
How might they accomplish this? Their first task is to eradicate the
norm of prior federal judicial experience-a norm that apparently began in
the 1950s and continues to structure presidential and senatorial choices
today. It is this norm, we believe, that has induced the homogeneity so ap-
parent on the current Court; and it is this homogeneity, as we have argued
throughout, that limits the ability of the Court to operate optimally.
Eradicating the norm should present no major difficulties. It only re-
quires the president to look beyond the U.S. courts of appeals towards
other potential sources of nominees, notably the state and federal legisla-
tures, private law firms, law schools, and executive branches, where pre-
sumably, if history is any indication, there are hundreds, if not thousands,
of qualified lawyers. In so doing, we hasten to note that the president
should not feel bound to fill the next three or four vacancies with, for ex-
ample, all federal legislators, former cabinet members, or legal academics.
This would only have the effect of perpetuating homogeneity on the Court
and, perhaps, create a new, equally troublesome norm (e.g., a norm of
elected political experience). Rather, the president must be attentive, as we
have been in this Article, to the career experiences of the justices remain-
ing on the Court and work in direct contrast to his recent predecessors to
avoid overrepresentation of those drawn from particular segments of the
legal community. Given the large pool that exists from which to draw po-
tential nominees, we cannot imagine that our current president and his suc-
cessors will find this a particularly onerous task. More to the point, it is a
task they ought desire to undertake in light of the serious consequences of
perpetuating the norm of prior judicial experience and the enormous bene-
fits of eradicating it.
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APPENDIX
Summary of Studies Exploring Links Between









































* rule for or
against the plain-
tiff
* refer cases to a
magistrate
Whether judges vote
for or against unions
Whether judges vote






Yes (e.g., judges with ex-
perience in private practice
representing management are
more likely to support union
claims than judges without
such experience)
Yes (judges with prior judi-
cial experience are more
likely to rule in favor of the
government than judges
without such experience)
213. In addition to the studies listed here, we should note Thomas G. Walker & William E.
Hulbary, Selection of Capable Justices, in THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES 52 (Albert P. Blaustein
& Roy M. Mersky eds., 1978). This work does not explore the link between occupation and judicial
decisions. Rather, it explores the link between Supreme Court justices' occupations and whether a
group of scholars rated the justices' careers as "great," "near great," "average," or "failure." Among the
many interesting findings is that scholars tended to give lower ratings to justices with prior judicial
experience.
214. Ashenfelter et al., supra note 61.
215. Brudney et al., supra note 61.
216. Kenneth M. Dolbeare, The Federal District Courts and Urban Public Policy, in THE
FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH 388 (Joel B. Grossman & Joseph Tanenhaus eds., 1969).
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" are prone to dis-
sent
Whether judges:





* are prone to dis-
sent
Whether justices vote
for or against claims
of sex discrimination
Whether judges vote
in the "liberal" or
"conservative" direc-





Yes (e.g., judges with prior
judicial experience are more
likely to support claims of
race discrimination than
judges without such experi-
ence).
No
Mixed but generally no
Mixed but generally no
Generally no
217. Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal
Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151 (1991).
218. Michael W. Giles & Thomas G. Walker, Judicial Policy-Making and Southern School
Segregation, 37 J. POL. 917 (1975).
219. Goldman, supra note 61.
220. Id.
221. Gerard S. Gryski et al., Models of State High Court Decision Making in Sex Discrimination
Cases, 48 J. POL. 143 (1986).
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" in private prac-
tice
" in government
" as a judge







Whether justices vote Yes (e.g., justices with
in the "liberal" or prosecutorial experience tend
"conservative" direc- to be more "conservative"
tion in several areas of than justices without such
the law experience)
Whether judges pub-
lish opinions or not
Whether justices vote
for or against criminal
defendants
Whether justices ad-
here to stare decisis or
not
What method judges
use to interpret tax
code
Yes (e.g., judges with ex-
perience representing
management are less likely
to publish opinions than
judges without such experi-
ence)
Yes (e.g., justices with
prosecutorial experience are
less favorable toward crimi-
nal defendants than justices
without such experience)
Yes (justices with prior judi-
cial experience are more
willing to abandon stare de-
cisis than justices without
such experience).
Yes (e.g., judges without
private practice work experi-
ence rely less on regulations
or pronouncements as their
primary interpretive ap-
proach than judges with such
experience)
222. J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 170
(1981).
223. Richard E. Johnston, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: A Comparison of the Warren and
Burger Courts, in CASES IN AMERICAN POLITICS (Robert L. Peabody ed., 1976).
224. Merritt & Brudney, supra note 61, at 95-96.
225. Stuart S. Nagel, Judicial Backgrounds and Criminal Cases, 53 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
333 (1962).
226. Schmidhauser, supra note 61, at 200.
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in the "liberal" or
"conservative" direc-
tion in several areas of
the law
Whether justices vote
in the "liberal" or
"conservative" direc-





Yes (e.g., judges with crimi-
nal defense experience are
more likely to invalidate
guidelines than those without
such experience)
Mixed
Yes (e.g., justices with
prosecutorial experience are
more "conservative" than
justices without such experi-
ence)
Yes (e.g., justices with
prosecutorial experience are
more "conservative" than
justices without such experi-
ence)
227. Schneider, supra note 61, at 349.
228. Sisk et al., supra note 61, at 1382.
229. JOHN D. SPRAGUE, VOTING PATTERNS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: CASES IN
FEDERALISM 1889-1959 109-11 (1968).
230. C. NEAL TATE & PANU SITTIWONG, DECISION MAKING IN THE CANADIAN SUPREME
COURT: EXTENDING THE PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES MODEL ACROSS NATIONS, 51 J. POL. 900, 911-12
(1989).
231. Tate & Handberg, supra note 61, at 474-76.
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"conservative" direc-





in the "liberal" or
"conservative" direc-
tion in several areas of
the law








Yes (e.g., justices with prior
judicial experience are more
"liberal" than justices with-
out such experience)
Yes (justices with political
experience are more likely to
dissent than justices without
such experience)





Generally yes (e.g., judges
who held state political of-
fice are more negatively dis-
posed toward race cases than
judges who did not hold such
positions)
232. Tate, supra note 177, at 361-63.
233. S. Sidney Ulmer, Dissent Behavior and the Social Background of Supreme Court Justices, 32
J. POL. 580 (1970).
234. Ulmer, supra note 61, at 624-25.
235. Kenneth N. Vines, Federal District Judges and Race Relations Cases in the South, 26 J. POE.
338 (1964).
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